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Executive Summary 
To examine the incidence, frequency, size of verdicts and other aspects 
of the medical malpractice system in Illinois, this study looked at statewide 
data where available, and concentrated on two regions: Cook and DuPage 
counties, which comprise almost half the population of the state of Illinois and 
two-thirds of its doctors; in addition it examined Madison and St. Clair 
counties, which have been characterized as “judicial hellholes.” 
 
For Cook and DuPage counties: 
• The data show no upward trends in filings or in filings per 100 
treating physicians from 1994 through 2004, when adjusted for 
population growth. 
 
• By one measure there was a modest decrease in medical 
malpractice trials between 1996 and 2001. Plaintiff win rates 
increased, but this change may be ascribed to other factors related 
to how cases are selected for trial.   
 
• A different set of data showed no increase in jury trials or in 
plaintiff win-rates between 2001 and 2004. 
 
•  Settlement mechanisms such as pre-verdict high-low agreements, 
acceptance of the limits of the doctor’s insurance policy and other 
devices showed that many jury verdicts were substantially reduced 
in the post-verdict phase of the lawsuit.  
 
 
A similar analysis in Madison and St. Clair counties reveals the 
following: 
•  Over a 14-year period from 1992 through the first part of 2005, 
only 11 jury verdicts favoring the plaintiff in medical malpractice 
cases were found in Madison and St. Clair county courts. Only two 
verdicts exceeded $1 million. 
 
 i
•  There is no evidence to support the perception that medical 
malpractice jury trials in these counties are frequent or that jury 
verdicts for plaintiffs are outrageous.   
 
•  Insofar as medical malpractice litigation is concerned, the 
reputation of Madison and St. Clair counties as “judicial hellholes” 
is not justified. 
 
An analysis of the data from Cook and DuPage counties revealed that a 
$500,000 cap on non-economic damages would have resulted in a minimal 
reduction in overall payouts to plaintiffs and would be unlikely to affect 
doctors’ liability insurance premiums.  But such a cap would result in 
significantly reduced compensation for some individual plaintiffs who suffered 
catastrophic injuries through medical negligence. 
 
An analysis of data from the American Medical Association does not support 
the claims that Illinois in general and Madison and St. Clair counties in 
particular are losing doctors: 
• There has been a steady increase in the absolute number of 
Illinois’ total patient care physicians, including OB-GYNs and 
neurological surgeons.  
 
• American Medical Association statistics through 2003 do not 




The Illinois tort system does not appear to be the cause of the undisputed fact 
that doctors’ liability insurance premiums showed dramatic rises.  It is time to 





Investigating the Tort System as the Cause of Medical Liability Insurance 
Increases 
 
Let us be clear from the beginning. There is no dispute about the fact 
that, beginning about the year 2001, the medical liability insurance premiums 
for some doctors rose very dramatically in Illinois as they did elsewhere in the 
U.S. Thus, it is reported that one obstetrician-gynecologist saw his malpractice 
liability insurance premium jump from $138,031 in 2003 to $230,428 in 
2004.1 Such increases are a serious impediment to practicing doctors and 
ultimately could have major effects not only on their incomes, but also on the 
viability of their practices and the health care of the patients they serve. 
The cause of the problem is hotly contested. Physicians, insurance 
companies and business organizations assert that the cause of the problem is 
the tort system in which patients file lawsuits against their doctors claiming 
medical negligence resulted in a serious injury. Then, they say, attempts to 
settle the lawsuit center on the likelihood that juries will be unfairly biased in 
favor of finding negligence and awarding unjustified large sums of money to the 
patient. In particular, they say, there is great fear of an outrageous award for  
“pain and suffering” above and beyond money for any incurred medical costs 
and lost income. Doctors and their liability insurers are forced to agree to 
inflated settlements because of fear that if the case goes to trial they will likely 
suffer even greater economic losses. This is called the “shadow effect” of jury 
trials.  
The President of the Illinois Hospital Association is quoted as saying that 
large awards have risen dramatically in both size and frequency since the year 
2000 and hospitals in Cook County said that their situation was especially 
dire.2
                                                 
1 Georgina Gustin and Phil Dine, Lax Insurance Regulation is Core of Malpractice Crisis, SAINT 
LOUIS POST DISPATCH, January 1, 2005. 
2 Daniel Vock, Legislators take Med-Mal Deadlock Head-on, CHICAGO DAILY LAW BULLETIN 
February 23, 2005.  
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Madison and St. Clair counties in southwestern Illinois have received 
particular attention and have been characterized as “judicial hellholes” where 
juries have made unjustified awards.3  
In contrast, plaintiff lawyers and consumer groups offer a different 
explanation for the problem. These groups assert that the cause lies with the 
business cycle in the medical insurance industry, claiming that the cycles are 
recurrent. In their view the problem is that insurers under-price premiums in 
good economic times and under-estimate future payouts. In addition 
downturns in the bond and stock markets where insurers invest their reserves 
add to the financial problems. The end result, these groups claim, is that when 
economic fluctuations in the business cycle squeeze income, the insurers raise 
their rates and blame plaintiff lawyers and juries.4
The Illinois State Bar Association, with 30,000 members, is the largest 
bar association in Illinois. It is a voluntary-membership association that 
provides a wide range of professional services for lawyers, and education and 
services for the public. Its membership includes lawyers representing plaintiffs 
and defendants in civil matters, as well as lawyers practicing in many other 
fields of law. This organization commissioned me to research the tort system as 
it pertains to medical malpractice litigation in Illinois. The tort system is only 
one part of the debate, but providing information about certain questions can 
shed important light on contentious issues: Have medical malpractice claims 
increased? Have jury trials increased? Have jury awards for medical 
malpractice increased? Have Madison and St. Clair counties earned their 
reputation as “judicial hellholes” insofar as medical malpractice claims are 
concerned? Is there evidence that doctors are leaving the state or certain areas 
of the state as a result of jury awards? 
I was chosen to undertake this research because I have been studying 
and writing about medical malpractice litigation since 1990. In addition to 
                                                 
3 Anonymous, Madison County: Bush in the “Hellhole, ST. LOUIS TODAY, January 5, 2005;” 
William Lamb, Illinois Trauma Cases Surge at SLU, STL TODAY, January 10, 2005. 
4 Joseph Treaster and Joel Brinkley, Behind those Medical Malpractice Rate Hikes, 151 CHICAGO 
DAILY LAW BULLETIN (February 22, 2005),  
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various articles in scholarly journals and law reviews, I wrote a book on the 
subject, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury: Confronting the Myths 
about Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets and Outrageous Damage Awards, 
University of Michigan Press (1995).  
Writing books and articles does not come without the possibility of being 
perceived to have a bias. Although, as the title of the book implies, I drew the 
conclusion that many claims about irresponsible juries in medical malpractice 
trials were unwarranted, my conclusions were based on careful, systematic 
empirical research. Plaintiff lawyers, not surprisingly, liked the book’s 
conclusions, but I also received praise in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, which said: “Tort reformers have often portrayed juries in medical 
malpractice cases as overly generous and irresponsible…. In Medical 
Malpractice and the American Jury, the author successfully counters this 
portrayal with a well-reasoned, painstaking analysis of jury verdicts and 
damage awards….”    
When I agreed to undertake the present research, the Illinois State Bar 
Association understood that I would draw conclusions based on whatever the 
evidence led me to conclude and that no restrictions would be placed on what I 
wrote in the report.  
Because the topic is contentious and interpretations open to questions, I 
undertook the research with a safeguard: transparency. All of the research data 
will be made available to any person or group that requests it. This is actually 
an easy task since I drew most of my conclusions from data sources that are 
readily available to the public or, in the case of verdict reports, can be obtained 
with little effort by interest groups.    
 
Data Sources 
In the chapters that follow I describe the data sources, but a brief 
recitation here will be helpful. One primary source was verdict reporters. These 
included the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter and the Southwestern Illinois 
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Jury Verdict Reporter. These data were supplemented by databases on verdicts 
and appellate courts available in Westlaw, Lexis, and Findlaw, primary on-line 
commercial sources used by legal researchers. The Cook County Jury Verdict 
Reporter is one of the oldest and most comprehensive sources of data for Cook 
and DuPage counties and, as I discovered, more comprehensive than other 
verdict reporters and more comprehensive than databases on verdicts compiled 
by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics. In addition, 
when crucial information was missing from verdict reports, I placed telephone 
calls to lawyers involved in the case and obtained that information. 
The Southwestern Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter covers Madison and St. 
Clair counties and is available on-line through Westlaw and Lexis.  I personally 
checked the accuracy of the Madison County reports by traveling to 
Edwardsville and reviewing every one of the medical malpractice verdicts it 
listed, finding no errors in the summaries, although in some instances I 
uncovered supplemental information about the cases.  
I also researched the data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of 
the U.S. Department of Justice. As will be described in Chapter 3, the BJS in 
collaboration with the National Center for State Courts, as part of its Civil 
Justice Survey of State Courts, conducted nationwide surveys of civil jury 
verdicts in 1996 and 2001. Those surveys included the courts in Cook and 
DuPage counties. The data are archived by the Inter-university Consortium of 
Political and Social Science Data at the University of Michigan.  I extracted the 
data for Cook and DuPage counties for those years.  
Another source of data was the American Medical Association’s annual 
report, Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the US. This report 
describes all non-federal doctors by state and separately by counties, including 
information about general areas of the doctor’s practice. I compiled data for 
Illinois as a whole and separately for Cook, DuPage, Madison and St. Clair 
counties from 1993 through 2003. Information on 2004 will not be available for 
another year.  
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Where relevant the analyses were adjusted for population and inflation 
using census data and the Consumer Price Index.    
In addition to these sources I researched the National Practitioner Data 
Bank. Created as part of the 1986 Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986, the NPDB reports on malpractice payments made on behalf of doctors by 
malpractice insurers. The reports are confidential but the NPDB makes a 
public file available that removes personal identifying information. I extracted 
data for Illinois that covered the years 1991 through 2004. A Wall Street 
Journal report criticized the NPDB as omitting many important cases, raising 
questions about its comprehensiveness.5 Then, as I began to sift through the 
data I found so many omissions of information that I concluded it was so 
unreliable as to be of little use for this research.6 I therefore omit it from 
further consideration in this report. 
 
An Unavailable Source 
One important source of data is missing from this report. The Illinois 
Department of Insurance compiles detailed records of closed medical 
malpractice claims that it requires medical malpractice liability insurers to 
report. In 2001 the Department compiled a report covering the years 1980 
through 1999.7 Unlike the states of Florida and Texas the data are not made 
available to the public. I attempted to gain access to the data collected since 
1999 to bring findings up to date. Unfortunately, despite a number of requests 
to gain access to the data, the Department of Insurance permission was not 
given. The data would have provided crucial information bearing on the 
controversy about medical malpractice litigation. The closed claims files 
                                                 
5 Joseph Hallinan, Doctor is Out: Attempt to Track Malpractice Cases is Often Thwarted---
Deleting a Physician’s Name from a Suit Before Settling Keeps it Out of Data Bank, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, August 27, 2004 at A1. 
6 For example, on a variable purporting to tell the forum in which a claim was settled, fully 33 
percent of cases were classified in a category called “unknown /before lawsuit” or were just 
blank. The data are supposed to report the severity of the injury but   97% of cases had no 
information on this variable. 
7 CASUALTY ACTUARIAL SECTION, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
STUDY (2001).  
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contain information about the frequency and magnitude of settlements as well 
as verdicts as well as the costs of defending those claims. Studies using the 
Florida and Texas databases demonstrate how valuable a resource closed claim 
data can be in shedding light on this important and controversial debate.8
 
The Remaining Chapters of This Report 
 Chapter 2 contains a very brief overview of information about medical 
malpractice litigation to provide laypersons background information about the 
subject and give them intellectual tools to understand data that is presented in 
the following chapters. The chapter presents only minimal information about a 
complex subject. References to sources discussing the topics in greater depth 
are provided in the footnotes.  
 Chapter 3 is about Cook and DuPage counties. These two counties 
contain 49 percent of Illinois’ total population and approximately two-thirds of 
its private doctors.9 I examined medical malpractice filings and jury verdicts in 
those counties as summarized by the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter, 
supplemented with additional research from on-line databanks and my 
telephone calls to the offices of lawyers involved in the cases.    
 Chapter 4 deals with jury verdicts in Madison and St. Clair counties. As 
noted above, these two counties have gained notoriety as “judicial hellholes” for 
defendants and have played a prominent role in the claims about the need for 
medical malpractice tort reform. I used the Southwestern Illinois Jury Verdict 
Reporter as my initial source, but supplemented it with a two-day visit 
examining the case files in the Madison County courthouse.  
                                                 
8 See Neil Vidmar et al.., Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of  Medical Malpractice Litigation: 
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 315 (2005); Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not 
Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES (2005, in press), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=678601. 
9 Illinois also has doctors who are employees of the federal government. The doctors are not 
affected by the liability insurance problem because they are insured by the federal government. 
And lawsuits against them must be adjudicated under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which 
requires trial by judge alone.  
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 Chapter 5 turns to the very contentious and often misunderstood topic of 
“pain and suffering.” Using the plaintiff verdicts from Cook and DuPage 
counties and studies by other researchers the report explores the role of “pain 
and suffering” in jury verdicts and the potential impact of a $500,000 cap on 
these damages.   
 Chapter 6 looks at changes in the availability of treating doctors in 
Illinois and Cook, DuPage, Madison and St. Clair counties from 1993 through 
2003. The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the question of whether 
the availability of treating doctors has changed over the years.  
 Chapter 7 discusses the conclusions and limitations of the research.               
 
What This Report Does Not Cover 
 The report is descriptive and does not pass judgment on the correctness 
or fairness of the individual jury verdicts that are reported, although it raises 
issues that will assist readers in drawing their own conclusions. Nevertheless, 
different parties will have different interpretations of the verdicts. The same 
reasoning applies to data about settlements.   
 The report does not investigate the economics or practices of the medical 
liability insurance industry. That subject is beyond my research mandate and 
areas of expertise. The findings about the tort system will raise questions about 
that subject, but they will have to be made by inference. The inference will be 





Medical Negligence and the Tort System: A Brief Primer for Laypersons 
 The tort system has many facets that bear on the controversy about 
medical negligence. This chapter is intended to describe some of the issues and 
empirical findings from other states as background and context for interpreting 
the Illinois data that I describe in subsequent chapters of this report. Each 
state has its own laws and legal culture, but, nevertheless, there are many 
similarities across states. The reader should be aware that there is a very 
substantial literature bearing on each of the topics discussed in this chapter.10 
It is intended only to provide guidance for other chapters in this report. 
Readers are encouraged to consult original sources referenced in the 
footnotes.11
 
Purposes of the Tort System 
 There are two central purposes to the tort system: (1) to compensate 
persons who are injured through the negligence of others and (2) to deter 
future negligent behavior in (a) the person who committed the instant act of 
negligence and (b) deter other persons from similar negligence by informing 
them that they might face civil liability if they engaged in similar acts of 
negligence. 
 Compensation in tort law as it has developed in the United States 
involves awards of monetary damages for losses. There are two main categories 
of losses. In Illinois they are commonly referred to as “economic” and “non-
economic” losses. For reasons that will be made clearer in Chapter 5, the latter 
                                                 
10 Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 N ENGL. J. MED.283 (2004) provides an excellent 
review of the history of contemporary problems of medical liability insurance.   See also, 
Michelle Mello et al. The New Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF 
MEDICINE 2281 (2003); Peter Akmajian, A Fair and Balanced Look at Tort Reform, FOR THE 
DEFENSE 33 (November 2004); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: 
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE 
AWARDS (1995); 54 DePaul Law Review Issue Number 2 (2005) (Whole Issue). 
11 Many of the footnotes contain references to my own writings because they summarize the 
other literature and offer citations to the original sources.  
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term can be a source of confusion for non-lawyers, but for now I will use both 
terms. 
 “Economic losses” are losses like medical expenses and lost income that 
result directly from the act of negligence. There are usually tangible hospital 
bills and tax receipts to prove past economic losses. Health care experts and 
accountants can use these records of the past to make projections about future 
“economic” losses and present them to a judge or jury in the form of expert 
testimony. The estimates of economic losses are sometimes hotly disputed, but 
at least it is relatively easy to calculate them using the metric of dollars. 
“Non-economic losses” have a much less tangible nature and it is difficult 
to apply an exact dollar metric.  Non-economic losses frequently are described 
as “pain and suffering.” How does anyone place an exact dollar figure on 
someone’s pain?  
A primary source of confusion with the term “non-economic” losses, 
however, is that pain and suffering is not the only element of this category of 
damages. There are other elements such as disfigurement, loss of 
companionship or loss of consortium; loss of moral guidance; loss of sexual 
gratification, and survival pain.12 Non-economic damages are called “general 
damages” in many states. By either name they are losses for which there is no 
clear dollar metric by which to judge them.  
In practical fact many of the legally-recognized categories of “non-
economic” damages have economic consequences. For example, if someone’s 
face is horribly disfigured it will probably cause social stigma and personal 
pain, but the injury may well have economic implications such as the person’s 
ability to obtain a well-paying job or finding a spouse. Should the amount differ 
if the disfigured person is 10-years-old or 70-years-old? “Wrongful death” is 
another category. To be sure there can be severe emotional pain for survivors 
but there may also be severe economic consequences for surviving children or 
                                                 
12 Neil Vidmar, Felicia Gross and Mary Rose, Jury Awards For Medical Malpractice and Post-
Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW 265,287 (1998). 
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for a surviving spouse or parents who were counting on the deceased person to 
render support and sustenance in their old age. 
 In our legal system the difficult task of assigning a monetary award for 
these less easily grasped losses has been left to the judgment of a jury. The 
theory behind having a jury decide is that it is composed of citizens from the 
community who will apply community norms to evaluate the injury’s worth. 
The jurors are instructed by the judge to apply their “common sense and 
judgment” in deciding what amount is appropriate in this particular case. 
Community norms in Arcola, Gillespie or Cairo may be different from Rockford 
or Chicago.   
 The deterrent effect of tort law is controversial. There are some who say 
that were it not for the threat of lawsuits there would be more medical 
negligence. Other persons insist that the threat of medical malpractice causes 
doctors to order unnecessary tests out of fear that they may be sued if 
something goes wrong. No one, including doctors, disagrees with the need to 
take steps to prevent unnecessary injuries, but the issue is whether the threat 
causes costly unnecessary medicine. Empirical evidence on deterrence and 
over-deterrence is difficult to prove one way or the other. 13
 
Medical Negligence Occurs 
 A Harvard University study of medical malpractice concluded that one 
out of every 100 patients admitted to a hospital had an actionable legal claim 
based on medical negligence. Some of these patients’ injuries were minor or 
transient but 14 percent of the time the injury resulted in death and as many 
as another 7 percent of patients suffered a permanent disability. Generally, the 
more serious the injury the more likely it was caused by negligence. Some of 
the Harvard findings have been contested, but other studies, including one 
                                                 
13 For a review of these issues see Michelle Mello and Troyen Brennan, Deterrence of Medical 
Errors: Theory And Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1595 (2002). 
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conducted in Illinois, have supported the findings and made estimates of 
negligence that are even higher.14
 
Injuries Can Have High Costs 
 If someone becomes paralyzed from the neck or waist down, they usually 
cannot work. If they are young and have children the income loss as well as 
medical expenses can be much more.  A baby with a severe brain injury may 
require constant attention to avoid bedsores and other illnesses and be subject 
to infections. In the very recent past, many of these children had short lives. 
Yet, with today’s advances in medicine many can be expected to live many 
decades. Life sustenance is an absolute moral obligation for most such 
instances, but there are enormous financial consequences.  
 A 1998 study of injuries caused by medical negligence undertaken by 
two economists conservatively estimated that the average economic costs for a 
brain-injured child was  $2.25 million in today’s dollars; persons who survived 
serious emergency room incidents had economic losses of over $2 million. In 
both of these estimates there was considerable variability between persons: 
some economic losses were much lower and in some cases they were much 
higher.15  
Advances in medicine over the past decade and a half have sometimes 
extended survival time and improved the lives of these persons, but here again 
the benefits come with very major economic liabilities.  
 
                                                 
14 PAUL WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL   INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND 
PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993) . PAUL WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL   INJURY, 
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993); PATRICIA DANZON, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1985); LINDA KOHN, JANET CORRIGAN AND 
MOLLA DONALDSON, EDS., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE ( 2000) at <http://books.nap.edu/catalog/9728.html?onpi_newsdoc112999>; Lucian 
Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Not Exaggerated, 284 JOURNAL OF THE 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 95 (2000).; Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in 
Situ;Implications for Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 357 (2005). 
15 Frank Sloan and Stephen van Wert, Costs of Injuries, Chapter 7 in FRANK SLOAN ET AL., 
SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993) 
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The Incidence of Claims is Lower than the Incidence of Injury 
 The Harvard study concluded that for every person filing a claim of 
medical negligence, eight times as many patients injured by medical negligence 
did not file a claim. Other studies have yielded similar estimates. One possible 
reason for this low claiming rate is that the patient does not discover the 
medical negligence. Another reason is that plaintiff lawyers carefully screen 
cases and select those that have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial 
and whose potential award justifies an investment of money, sometimes many 
thousands of dollars, to hire experts and many working hours before and 
during trial to prove the medical negligence.16
 
Most Cases Are Settled Without a Jury Trial 
 Only between 7 and 10 percent of claims go to trial by judge and jury. 
Somewhere between 40 to 50 percent of claims are eventually dropped by the 
patient during “discovery”–the pre-trial investigative stage in which the 
plaintiff’s lawyer obtains the medical records, hires experts, and questions the 
defendant’s experts. Of course, even in these no-payment cases the costs for 
defendants and their liability insurers can be expensive since they too have to 
pay for lawyers, experts and other litigation costs.17  
 Recent research in Florida has shown that as many as 26% of medical 
malpractice claims that result in payment to the claimant are settled by the 
health care provider through arbitration or without a formal lawsuit ever being 
filed. Even for claims resulting in more than a million dollars in payments 10 
percent were settled without a formal lawsuit. Under 8 percent of cases with 
million dollar payments were settled after a jury trial. Of 34 cases resulting in 
payments over $5 million only two were decided by juries.18  
                                                 
16 PAUL WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL   INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND 
PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993). 
17 Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, The Contingency 
Fee System and Social Policy, 20 LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW 101 (2005). 
18  Neil Vidmar, et al., Uncovering the “ Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: 
Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW315 (2005).  
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 Doctors and their insurance companies say that, nevertheless, they settle 
cases even for large amounts out of fear that if the case goes before a jury the 
amounts will be astronomically higher. This is called the “shadow effect” of jury 
trials. In contrast, some research findings suggest that insurers settle cases 
when their own internal investigation indicates that negligence did occur. 
However, even in such cases where negligence is judged to be likely, there may 
be great disagreement with the plaintiff about the amount of damages he or she 
should receive.19  
 Regardless of whether the claim results in payment or no payment or 
whether it goes to jury trial or is settled without trial, the process of resolution 
is slow. Between three and six years typically elapse between the filing of a 
lawsuit and final resolution. Some cases take even longer.20  
 
Many Malpractice Claims Have Multiple Defendants 
 
 Because of specialization in the health care field, multiple persons may 
treat a patient: a primary doctor, a surgeon, a radiologist, an anesthesiologist 
and hospital nurses and other staff. Sometimes at the beginning of a lawsuit it 
is not clear which health care provider is responsible for the alleged negligent 
injury. Later some defendants may be dropped from the claim. In other 
instances the lawsuit will assert that multiple parties are responsible for the 
alleged negligent outcome.21
 For some cases that eventually go to trial, one or more defendants may 
settle with the patient before trial. What this means is that sometimes a 
                                                 
19 Ralph Peeples, et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of 
Standard of Care, 37, WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 877 (2002); Mark Taragin et al., The Influence 
of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 1780 (1992); Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay 
on Patient Interests, The Contingency Fee System and Social Policy, 20 LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW 
REVIEW 101 (2005).    
20 Id. See also, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS STUDY, (2001); 
MARK KREIDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLOSED CLAIMS STUDY, Department of Insurance 
Commissioner, State of Washington  (February, 2005).  
21 NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT 
JURY INCOMPETENCE,  DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995). 
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plaintiff who loses at trial may have received money from other parties that 
were sued. Very often hospitals named as defendants because their staff was 
indirectly involved in the patient’s treatment settle for relatively small amounts. 
By relatively small I mean small compared to the patient’s overall damages 
claim. The hospital may decide to settle to avoid the risk that at trial they could 
be held accountable for a much larger award, even though the hospital does 
not believe it is negligent. Often the amount of any prior settlement from one 
defendant will be “set off,” that is, deducted from the award the jury levies 
against the other defendants.22
 
Doctors Win Most Jury Trials 
 Research on medical malpractice trials across the country indicates that 
when the case goes to trial the juries decide in favor of the plaintiff only 
between 20 to 30 percent of the time. The causes of variability in win rates 
across states or over time are difficult to determine. While one explanation is 
that juries differ, other plausible explanations are that the strengths of claims 
differ, that lawyers vary in the cases they select for trial, and that negotiation 
and settlement dynamics differ over time and places. In short the data cannot 
tell us whether juries decide cases differently or whether juries decide different 
cases.  
These statistics surprise many people. Part of the problem is that 
newspapers tend to report only cases with prevailing plaintiffs being awarded 
large sums of money while ignoring cases with smaller sums or cases in which 
defendants prevail.  
Interviews with jurors who decided cases found that jurors view many 
claims with skepticism. They often expressed two interrelated views, namely 
that too many people want to get something for nothing and that doctors 
should not be blamed for simple human misjudgment.23   
 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  
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Deciding Negligence and Compensation in Medical Malpractice Cases 
 The first task of a jury or judge is to determine if negligence occurred and 
if that negligence was the direct cause of the injury that the patient suffered. In 
many areas of tort law jurors are instructed to apply a “reasonable person” test 
to determine negligence, but in medical malpractice claims there is a different 
test—the medical standard of care used by doctors in the particular area of 
practice. With some rare exceptions, at trial the plaintiff is required to call an 
expert (or experts) proficient in that field of medicine to testify that he or she 
has concluded that the defendant doctor violated the standard of care. The 
defendant doctor usually also calls experts who have a different opinion. Each 
side’s witnesses are cross-examined by the opposing lawyer. 
There is also the issue of causation. Many medical procedures have a 
risk of an “iatrogenic” injury or illness. An infection may develop at the site of a 
surgical procedure or a prescribed drug may interact with a particular patient’s 
biological system no matter how careful the doctor is in following the standard 
of care. Many persons who seek medical care are already suffering from serious 
illnesses or injuries and the contentious issue is whether the bad outcome was 
a result of negligent treatment or the underlying disease or injury. A doctor 
might even admit negligence but argue that the negligence was not the 
proximal cause of the bad outcome.  
In deciding liability the jury has the facts and arguments from both sides 
on the standard of care and theories of causation. The judge instructs them 
that to prevail the plaintiff must prove the case on the “balance of 
probabilities.” Unlike a criminal trial which uses a “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard, the judge explains that the balance of probabilities means “more 
likely than not.” Judges usually refrain from using exact figures but find 
interesting ways to say the jurors must be convinced that, compared to the 
defendant’s evidence, there is at least a fifty-one percent likelihood that the 
plaintiff’s evidence is correct. 
If the jury decides a doctor is liable it must then assess the damages. 
During the trial the jury will also have heard evidence about the past and 
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future medical, income or other economic losses of the patient that resulted 
from the negligence. The jurors will also have heard evidence bearing on the 
plaintiff’s emotional and physical experiences that are an alleged consequence 
of the injury.  
The jurors will also be instructed to apply their best skills in determining 
the worth of the non-economic damages, being neither generous nor stingy. 
Debates can ensue about whether some elements of damages such as 
disfigurement are non-economic losses since serious disfigurements may affect 
employment or marriage opportunities.  
Punitive damages, even for behavior that is wanton, malicious, or 
fraudulent, are not allowed in Illinois for defendants in medical malpractice 
cases. 
 
Trial by Judge and Jury 
 The jury’s task in a medical malpractice trial is not an easy one, but 
often overlooked in debates about jury trials is that it is really trial by judge 
and jury. The judge rules on the evidence that is admissible and instructs the 
jury on the law. Equally important, the jury’s verdict does not become 
legitimate or enforceable until the judge enters a “judgment” on the verdict. 
Having seen and heard the same evidence as the jury, the judge can set part or 
all of the verdict aside and order a new trial, enter a directed verdict for one or 
all of the defendants or reduce the amount of the damages if the judge feels the 
verdict is inconsistent with the trial evidence. Additionally, if the case is 
appealed, a panel of three or more judges may overturn parts or all of the 
judgment. Specific examples of judicial oversight may be seen in cases 




 Questions are sometimes raised about whether the jury, composed of a 
group of laypersons, is competent to make the complicated decisions required 
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in malpractice cases. Likewise, it would be absurd to claim that juries always 
get it right; but one study found that jury verdicts were generally consistent 
with evaluations of whether negligence occurred that were made by neutral 
doctors. Other studies, while not specifically dealing with medical malpractice, 
show that trial judges agree with civil jury verdicts most of the time. These 
studies will not satisfy every critique because the decisions are judgment calls. 
Each side will contend that the evidence favored their position. Chapters 3 and 
4 present short summaries of a number of cases and the juries’ verdicts. Even 
though readers will not have heard the evidence that the jury heard, the 
summaries allow different readers to make their own evaluations. It is 
noteworthy that in most cases the trial judge agreed with the jury verdict—but 
not always.24
 
Jury Awards Do Not Necessarily Reflect the Final Payment to the Plaintiff 
 Cases are often settled for less than the jury’s award. This is particularly 
true of very large awards. There are four main processes by which awards are 
reduced. The trial judge or an appeals court may reduce the award. Sometimes 
the two sides agree to a high-low agreement before trial, during trial or even 
during jury deliberations. This occurs in cases where both sides are not 
entirely confident about the strength of their case and become risk averse. 
They enter into an agreement that no matter what the jury decides the 
defendant will pay a certain amount to the plaintiff and if the plaintiff wins the 
defendant will have to pay only the agreed highest amount. Chapter 3 provides 
some good examples.  
Sometimes a winning plaintiff will settle for less than the jury verdict in 
order to avoid a long delay in payment and the risk of losing if the defendant 
appeals. Finally, plaintiffs usually settle for the limits of the doctor(s) liability 
insurance coverage if the award exceeds the insurance coverage. Hospitals that 
                                                 
24 Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, The Contingency 
Fee System and Social Policy, 20 LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW 101 (2005).    
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are self-insured usually have some form of excess liability insurance to protect 
their assets.25
 Chapters 3 and 4 contain examples bearing on all of these post-trial 
adjustments in Illinois cases.  
 
Liens Against Recovery 
 If a patient is injured through medical negligence, his or her medical bills 
may be paid by taxpayer-supported Medicare or Medicaid, or by a private 
insurer like Blue Cross/Blue Shield. If the injured person cannot work, a 
private or public source may pay some or all of their expected wages. If the 
injured person subsequently receives a jury award or settlement from a 
negligent medical provider, that entity has a right to recover that portion of the 
award that it paid in benefits as a result of the injury. Medicare and Medicaid 
are required to seek reimbursement. There is very little accurate information on 
the extent to which this occurs and the degree of recovery but plaintiff lawyers 
deal with liens routinely even before they start a lawsuit. The amount 
taxpayers and private health insurers recover may amount to hundreds of 
thousands or even millions of dollars from malpractice settlements every 
year.26      
 
Doctors Who Are Federal Employees or State Employees 
 A number of doctors and other health care providers are employees of the 
federal government. Some examples are doctors on military bases or Veterans 
Administration hospitals. These doctors may provide regular medical services 
including delivering babies. They too can be sued but their employer is the self-
insured United States government. The doctors do not carry private 
professional liability insurance. Federal employees must be sued under the 
                                                 
25 Id.; Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money and the Moral Code of the Personal Injury Bar, 35 
LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 257 (2002).  
26 See HERBERT KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2004); Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient 
Interests, The Contingency Fee System and Social Policy, 20 LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW 
101 (2005).     
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Federal Tort Claims Act that provides for trial by judge alone rather than trial 
by jury.   
Some healthcare providers are employees of the State of Illinois and are 
insured by the State of Illinois, for example, state mental hospital employees. 
The laws of Sovereign Immunity may not shield claims of medical malpractice 
against these employees and in such cases claims may be decided in a jury 
trial.27       
 
Summary 
 This chapter has presented a minimal sketch of important issues and 
concepts related to medical malpractice litigation. It is a complicated subject. 






                                                 
27  See, e.g. Jinkins v. Lee and Medlin, 04L-5967 (Cook County), Access Plus Jury Verdict  




Medical Malpractice Litigation in Cook and DuPage Counties 
Cook County and DuPage County are the most populous counties in 
Illinois. Cook, with a population of more than 5.3 million persons, constitutes 
approximately 42 percent of Illinois’ 12,600,000 citizens, and DuPage, with a 
population of over 900,000, accounts for another 7 percent.28 The two 
combined represent almost half of Illinois’ 12.6 million citizens. These two 
counties also accounted for 67.6% of Illinois’ 30,264 non-federal “patient care” 
physicians in 2003.29 A number of sources of data bearing on medical 
malpractice litigation are available for these two counties. This chapter draws 
upon those data sources to present a profile of case filings over time, verdicts 
after trial, and post-verdict adjustments to awards. Additionally, some data 
give insights about settlements.    
 
Case Filings in Cook and DuPage Counties: 1994-2004 
The Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter compiles statistics on annual 
filings of civil litigation.  John Kirkton of the Reporter compiled separate 
statistics for medical malpractice filings in Cook and DuPage counties from 
1994 through 2004.30 These data shed light on the extent to which medical 
malpractice lawsuits have increased over the past decade.  
 Before presenting these data a note of caution is in order. Case filings do 
not always translate into settlements or jury verdicts. In some instances the 
filing enables a plaintiff’s lawyer to obtain medical records and other material 
but further investigation with the help of these records persuades the lawyer 
                                                 
28 <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/17031.html>  
29 See American Medical Association, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.S., 
2003 edition, AMA Press 2003. Federal physicians are those employed or supported by the U.S. 
Government, which is self-insured for the liability of its physicians.  Lawsuits against its 
physicians fall under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which requires trials to be conducted by 
judges acting without a jury.  
30 Mr. Kirkton informed me that this compilation was made available to a number of parties on 
both sides of the tort reform issue some time before I requested the data. 
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that there is insufficient evidence to continue the lawsuit and it is 
abandoned.31 To the extent that this is true the statistics may overestimate the 
extent of medical malpractice litigation. On the other hand recent research 
bearing on malpractice litigation in Florida32 uncovered the fact that the parties 
settled over 20 percent of all cases involving payments to claimants without a 
formal lawsuit being filed. For settlements involving payments over $1 million, 
slightly more than 10% were settled in a pre-lawsuit phase. To the extent that 
similar processes occur in Illinois, case filings may under-estimate payments 
by medical health providers and their insurers. Nevertheless, filings provide a 
reasonable measure of medical malpractice claiming. 
 Table 3.1 shows the number of filings in Cook and DuPage counties by 
year. In addition Table 1 also presents data on the number of non-federal 
treating physicians in each county per year through 2003.33  (Physician figures 
for 2004 and 2005 were not available at the time this report was written.) From 
these two figures a third variable was constructed to show the number of 
lawsuits filed per number of physicians. This last statistic needs to be treated 
cautiously since there is a time lag between a medical incident and the filing of 
lawsuits. Typically, at least two years elapse between a medical incident and a 
claim, but in some cases the lawsuit may be filed many years after the 
incident. For instance, a person who was a minor when an incident occurred 
may file after he or she reached the age of majority, producing a long lag time.  
 
                                                 
31 See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY (1995) at 69-92. 
32 Vidmar et al., Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights from 
Florida, 54 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 315(2005).  
33 There are also treating  physicians who are federal employees, such as those associated with 
military bases, Veterans Administration hospitals and the Public Health Service. The federal 
government assumes professional liability for these physicians. In consequence, malpractice 
lawsuits against federal physicians do not play a role in private liability insurance premiums.    
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Table 3.1: Case Filings, Number of Treating Physicians and Filings Per 
Capita of Treating Physicians: 1994-2003 
 















1994 1831 15,114 12.1 113 2,393 4.7 
1995 1722 15,579 11.0 119 2,618 4.5 
1996 1235 15,673 7.9 80 2,735 2.9 
1997 1262 16,298 7.7 70 2,881 2.4 
1998 1353 16,043 8.4 60 2,916 2.1 
1999 1214 15,835 7.7 70 3,028 2.3 
2000 1319 16,205 8.1 60 3,208 1.8 
2001 1360 16,339 8.3 60 3,319 1.8 
2002 1324 16,266 8.1 80 3,327 2.4 
2003 1443 16,782 8.5 60 3,423 1.8 
2004 1226 * * 57 * * 
 
 
 The table shows that filings from 2000 through 2004 in both Cook and 
DuPage counties were substantially lower than in 1994 and 1995. Except for a 
decrease in 2004, filings have remained relatively steady since 1998, although 
there are some yearly fluctuations. The second column in the table shows that 
filings per 100 treating physicians in Cook County remained steady at between 
approximately 8 and 8.5 from 1996 through 2003. DuPage County shows a 
similar trend although the filing rates are much lower, varying between 1.8 and 
2.4 per one 100 physicians.  
 The much higher rate of filings per 100 physicians in Cook as opposed to 
DuPage County appears puzzling. However, an additional examination of 
physician statistics suggests a likely explanation for part of the difference. The 
AMA’s physician database disaggregates treating physicians into a number of 
separate categories and one of those categories is “hospital based practice.”34  
                                                 
34  American Medical Association, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE US, 
editions 1995 –2005. 
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In Cook County 35 percent of treating physicians in 2003 listed themselves as 
engaged in hospital-based practice whereas in DuPage County only 18 percent 
listed themselves in this category. To the extent that claims involving medical 
incidents are more likely to arise in hospital settings, hospital practice may 
explain part of the difference. The demographics of the patients seeking health 
care, the types of health services provided and other factors may also 
contribute to the higher rate, but the data do not help us further on these 
hypotheses. 
 Once again the reader is cautioned to keep firmly in mind two caveats. 
First, filings do not necessarily equate to payments to claimants. Second, 
unpaid claims incur defense costs by liability insurers.35 Nevertheless, with 
these caveats in mind the principal finding from this analysis is that the data 
show no upward trends in filings or in filings per 100 treating physicians in 
either Cook or DuPage counties.  
 
Jury Verdicts Over Time:  The Bureau of Justice Statistics Research, 1996 
and 2001 
Much of the current controversy in Illinois involves claims about jury 
verdicts increasing in both frequency and magnitude of awarded damages. 
Cook and DuPage counties are the two Illinois counties represented in a survey 
of nationwide civil court statistics carried out by the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics in collaboration with the National Center 
for State Courts. Called the Civil Justice Survey, the civil court records of forty-
six of the nation’s most populous counties, statistically representing the 
nations 75 most populous counties, were systematically surveyed in 1996 and 
2001.36 The data include identification of medical malpractice jury verdicts and 
                                                 
35 See Vidmar et al. at note 5. 
36 See, CAROL DEFRANCES AND MARIKA LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CIVIL 
JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, 
available at < http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ctcvlc96.htm.;  Thomas Cohen , Tort 
Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Civil Justice 
Survey of State Courts, 2001 , November  2004, NCJ 206240, available at   
< http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/ttvlc01.htm>.   
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their outcomes. The research has resulted in various reports that focus on 
nationwide statistics, including jury verdicts. The raw data are archived by the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research that is 
headquartered at the University of Michigan. These surveys purport to provide 
a comprehensive listing of all civil jury trials, including disaggregation of 
medical malpractice cases in the chosen locations.37   
Data supplied by John Kirkton from the Cook County Jury Verdict 
Reporter indicates that, at least in 2001, the BJS survey substantially under-
reported the number of medical malpractice cases in Cook and DuPage 
counties. BJS reported 78 jury trials whereas the verdict reporter identified 99 
jury trials.38 The Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter data will be addressed in 
the next section of this chapter.  However, working on an assumption that the 
Bureau of Justice’s sampling techniques were the same in both years, the BJS 
data can be used to make comparisons of changes in jury verdicts between 
1996 and 2001.39  They also allow us to make comparisons with nationwide 
trends.  
                                                 
37 In our research attempting to identify more details about the cases identified in the survey 
we found several cases that involved product liability claims against medical manufacturers as 
well as health care providers. It was not always clear that the main defendant was the health 
care provider. In at least two cases the health care provider was either dropped from the 
lawsuit before trial or was found not liable. This finding raises the possibility that the BJS 
statistics may slightly overstate the number of medical malpractice trials in their sample. 
Another possibility is that while the Cook County Verdict Reporter includes cases in which 
hospitals are the sole or primary defendant, the BJS sampling excluded such cases. Since the 
BJS data do not identify plaintiffs or defendants, it is not possible to check this hypothesis 
against the data.    
38 There was also a $3,689,733 verdict against a chiropractic clinic (Tews v. Stoxen Chiropractic 
Clinic, Docket No. 99L-12631, involving allegations of fraud, and two dental malpractice trials, 
one of which resulted in an $11,250 plaintiff win and another resulting in a defense win. These 
trials were eliminated from the analysis. 
39 Despite proceeding with this comparison, the assumption is open to challenge. The BJS data 
are purported to be comprehensive of all verdicts. The Cook County Verdict Reporter data 
clearly show that in 2001 the BJS study under-reported jury verdicts by 21 percent (99 cases 
in CCVR versus 78 in the BJS research).  Further problems arise with the BJS data.  The first 
BJS survey was conducted in 1992, see DEFRANCES, C. ET AL., CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN 
LARGE COUNTIES, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report (July 
1996, NCJ –154346.) Although medical malpractice cases were reported for other venues in 
1992 our search of the raw data discovered that medical malpractice verdicts were not 
specifically distinguished from other personal injury torts in both Cook and DuPage Counties. 
Despite the problems that we have identified, many researchers treat the BJS data as an 
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Changes in the Frequency of Jury Trials 
 Table 3.2 reports the number of medical malpractice trials in Cook and 
DuPage counties over the two time periods along with adjustments for changes 
in the number of treating physicians. In 1996 Cook County had 15,673 non-
federal treating physicians and in 2001 it had 16,339 treating physicians. 
DuPage County had 2735 physicians in 1996 and in 2001 there were 3319 
physicians.  
 
Table 3.2: Frequency of Jury Trials by Year and in Proportion to 1000 
Treating Physicians 
 
Year Cook County DuPage County 









1996 81 5 7 3 
2001 78 5 8 2 
 
 
The table shows no difference between 1996 and 2001. Note again that 
the data address trials, not lawsuits or settlements arising out of those 
lawsuits. As noted in Chapter 2, based on nationwide data, trials occur in less 
than ten percent of all medical malpractice lawsuits. The current debate in 
Illinois, however, has centered on jury trials and the effect of jury awards on 
settlements. Thus, it is reasonable to ask about jury trial frequency.   
The data in Table 3.2 do not reflect the possibility that more than one 
physician or health care entity, such as a hospital or clinic, was named as a 
defendant in the lawsuit. The data provide some insight about the complexity 
of litigation and its potential effect on defendants. Table 3.3, therefore, was 
constructed to show these differences. For ease of presentation the data for 
Cook and DuPage counties were combined.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
authoritative source and a decision was made to report comparisons between 1996 and 2001as 
a separate section in this report.    
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Table 3.3: Number of Defendants (and Percent of Total) Named 









1 27 (31%) 26 (33%) 
2 19 (22%) 31 (40%) 
3 13 (15%) 13 (17%) 
4 9 (10%) 5 (6%) 
5 8 (9%) 2 (3%) 
6 3 (3.%) 1 (1%) 
7 3 (3%) -- 
9 1 (1%) -- 
10 1 (1%) -- 
11 2 (2%) -- 
12 1 (1%) -- 
Total 87 78 
                                    Note: percentage of total trials is rounded to nearest whole number 
   
Table 3.3 shows that approximately one third of trials involve more than 
one defendant in all three time periods, but the number of trials exceeding 
more than three defendants declined substantially by 2001, compared to 1996. 
These changes may reflect changes in the litigation strategies as discussed in 
more detail below. 
 
Rates at Which Plaintiffs Prevailed at Trial 
 How often do plaintiffs prevail when a jury decides their case? In 
addressing this question we again combined the data for Cook and DuPage 
counties. The findings are reported in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: Plaintiff Win-Rates By Year (Frequencies and Percentages) 
Year 1996 2001 
Plaintiff Verdicts 15 (19%) 28 (36%) 
Defense Verdicts 71 (81%) 50 (64%) 
Directed Verdict for 
defendant 
1  (1 %) 0 
Other 1 (1%) 0 
Total 88 (101%) 78 (100%) 
                 Note: Percents rounded to nearest whole number 
  
Table 3.4 shows that while the number of trials declined by 10 from 1996 
to 2001, plaintiffs were more successful when they went to trial. The plaintiff’s 
win rate trends are somewhat at variance with nationwide trends in plaintiff 
win rates.40 In 1996 the national plaintiff win rate was 25.9% and in 2001 the 
plaintiff win rate was 27.1 %. Thus, in 1996 Cook and DuPage Counties were 
lower than the national average and in 2001 they were higher than the national 
average.41  
 It is not possible to ascertain the cause of these differences in plaintiff 
win rates, both over time and in comparison to nationwide data because there 
are different plausible, and not necessarily exclusive, explanations. One 
hypothesis is that jury attitudes toward plaintiffs and defendants changed (or 
are different from state to state) but there are equally plausible competing 
hypotheses. Laws may differ from state to state; laws may change over time 
within states; plaintiff lawyer strategies in the cases they choose to litigate may 
change; the development of alternative dispute resolution such as mediation or 
arbitration may affect rates of trial; both plaintiff and defense negotiation 
                                                 
40 Carol DeFrances and Marika Litras, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties,1996, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE  STATISTICS BULLETIN, NCJ 173426, September 1999; Thomas Cohen, Tort 
Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, November  
2004 NCJ 206240; Thomas Cohen, Medical Malpractice Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties , 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN , April 2004, No.NCJ 203098 
41 For comparison the COOK COUNTY VERDICT REPORTER data, discussed in more detail in the 
next section, shows a 2001 plaintiff win rate in Cook County  and DuPage County combined  
for a win rate of 30 percent. The difference between the calculated BJS plaintiff win rate and 
the Cook-DuPage plaintiff win rate from the Cook County Verdict Reporter is thus about 4 
percent.  
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strategies may change and thus affect whether cases are settled or go to trial; 
the way evidence is presented at trial may change. Posed simply, from these 
data we cannot determine whether juries were deciding cases differently or 
whether they were deciding different cases.42   
 
Jury Awards in Cook and DuPage Counties: 2001 
 What do juries award when plaintiffs prevail? We assessed this question 
by examining mean awards for Cook and DuPage Counties combined for the 
year 2001.43 For these analyses we use the more comprehensive set of data 
from the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter supplemented by additional reports 
of cases contained in databases reported in Westlaw. The mean is the 
arithmetic average. 
  
A Reminder About Jury Verdicts 
 Before this analysis is presented several caveats that were discussed in 
Chapter 2 need to be repeated. First, jury verdicts are not necessarily the 
amount that the plaintiff actually receives. In some cases the judge may reduce 
that amount in entering judgment. In other cases the parties may enter into a 
high-low agreement prior to the verdict. Often, cases with high-low agreements 
are not disputes about the health provider’s liability but rather about the 
amount of the damages. In other instances high-low agreements may reflect 
the fact that the two sides recognize that the issue of liability is about a fifty-
fifty probability and both become risk-averse. As a consequence, they enter into 
a mutual agreement that prevents an extreme outcome, such as the plaintiff 
                                                 
42 See Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us about Jury 
Behavior and the Tort System. 27 SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1205 (1994/1996).   
43 The trials include medical malpractice lawsuits against medical doctors defined as having 
MD degrees and hospitals and their employees. Malpractice lawsuits against dentists, 
podiatrists chiropractors, physical therapists, pharmacies and nursing homes or other 
healthcare providers that did not include MDs or hospitals as defendants are not included in 
this research. A few cases classified as medical malpractice were actually slip and fall or 
contract disputes and were eliminated from consideration.    
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receiving nothing or the defendant being faced with a catastrophic damage 
award.44  
Plaintiffs may settle for the limits of the defendant’s medical liability 
insurance coverage rather than press for the full judgment.45   In other cases 
the plaintiff may agree to settle for less than the judgment to avoid the 
defendant’s appeal of the verdict, possibly losing everything if the judgment is 
overturned, but in any event suffering a long delay in receiving any money 
through the long delays as the case winds its way through the appeals courts. 
Additionally, an appeals court may overturn the verdict and the judgment or 
the amount of damages may be reduced. 
A final reminder is that a plaintiff who loses at trial against one or more 
defendants may still receive substantial sums of money from other defendants 
in the lawsuit who settled prior to trial. The jury will not be aware of these 
agreements when they render their verdict. In some instances in which the 
plaintiff does prevail at trial, the amounts of prior settlements by other 
defendants will be deducted from the judgment, a deduction called a “set-off.”  
The case summaries, reported below, find examples of these various settlement 
outcomes. 
 The final caution is that these data do not tell us if the jury verdict was 
correct on either the issue of liability or the amount of damages. There is no 
absolute truth about right or wrong. Cases come to trial because there is a 
dispute about either liability or damages or both. Under the law the resolution 
of the dispute is left to the jury and the trial judge who enters the judgment. In 
appealed cases, appellate courts review whether the decisions of the judge and 
jury were correct. They may overturn verdicts or awards.  
The central lesson to keep in mind is that jury verdicts can be less or can 
be more than what is reported in the newspapers and portrayed by the parties 
on both sides of the dispute about tort reform. This chapter will report not only 
                                                 
44  Importantly, the jury and, most likely the judge, will be totally unaware of this high-low 
agreement. 
45  See, Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 
LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, 275, 284-85 (2001). 
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damage verdicts but separately report some of these “hidden” outcomes.  The 
year 2001 was chosen for detailed study for several reasons. It is the year 
studied by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The year 2001 is a year when the 
problem with medical malpractice insurance began to be publicly recognized. 
Most important, the three-to-four-year time gap between 2001 and 2005 allows 
time for post-verdict settlements and for contested verdicts to be scrutinized by 
appellate courts, permitting insight into final outcomes of jury trials. 
 
Plaintiff Verdicts and Adjustments in 2001 
The Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter data indicate there were a total of 
99 medical malpractice jury trials in Cook and DuPage counties in 2001.46 
Plaintiffs prevailed in 30 of these cases, a 30 percent win rate.47 Table 3.5 
reports the name of the case, a short description of the plaintiff’s claim, the 
amount of the verdict, and any post-trial adjustments to the verdict. The 
footnotes in the table report the nature of the adjustment, but each of these 






                                                 
46 Again note that these data are more comprehensive than the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
data discussed in the previous section. 
47 In a small number of cases the jury was deadlocked. Deadlocked juries are treated as a 
defense win since the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.  The plaintiff has a right to have the 
case retried.  
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Table 3.5:  Plaintiff Verdicts and Adjustments in Cook and DuPage Counties, 2001 
 
Case Claim Amount of Award 
Award after 
Adjustment 
Bryant v. LaGrange Memorial Hospital , 
Kim & others Birth injury-cerebral palsy $30,000,000$1,100,000 a
Lawler v. Lamont Delayed cancer diagnosis $3,800,000 $3,800,000 b
Brewster v.  West & two others 
Foot fracture misdiagnosed : 
subsequent surgery $170,000 $170,000 
Aceves v. Orihuela Bile duct cut-reconstructive surgery $467,900 $467,900 
E. Munoz v. Clemis & others 
Delayed cancer diagnosis: larynx 
surgery; chemotherapy $2,495,893 $2,495,893 
D. Munoz v. Herman & others Mis-diagnosis: testicle removed $150,000 $0 c
McNamara v. Grimaldi 
Informed consent re vasectomy: pain 
and suffering $317,000 $317,000 
Matthews  v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital Stillborn birth $3,781,393 $3,781,393 
Genovese v. Caro Cornea puncture: subsequent surgery $494,906 $494,906 
Willis v. Bracket & others Hip surgery: corrective surgery $120,608 $120,608 
Bales v. Groya & others Misdiagnosis: leg amputation $2,812,553 $2,812,553 
Washington v. Wilczynski & others Diagnosis delay: loss of testicle $200,000 $200,000 
Gonzales v. Pla 
Undiagnosed kidney disease requires 
transplant $1,191,256 $950,000 d
Waliczek v. Gutta 
Other patient's blood thinner given: 
Death $6,500,000 $800,000 e
Stajsczyk v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital & 
others Jugular vein puncture: death $801,643 $801,643 
Thomas v. Hosain & others Antibiotic delay: death $835,000 $835,000 
Matei v. Patel & others Premature discharge: infant dies $525,000 $525,000 
Skonieczny v. Gardner & others 
Birth injury: nerve damage (Erb's 
palsy) $13,298,052$2,000,000 f
Christy v. Cavanaugh 
Misdiagnosis brain disease: pain and 
suffering $2,500,000 $2,500,000 
Cork v. Cook County Hospital 
Improper management of injury: child 
dies $5,300,000 $0 g
Simpson v. Allswede & others 
Tracheal tube damage to child burn 
victim $2,563,492 $1,900,000 h
Cummings v. Suprenant & others Excessive radiation: severe burns $1,250,000 $1,250,000 
Salas v. Michael Reese Hospital 
& others Unnecessary surgery: death of toddler $2,750,000 $2,750,000 
Guerin v. Yu & others Death of mother following C-section $7,622,040 $7,000,000 i
Banis v. Loyola U Hospital& others 
Surgery & misdiagnosis: amputation 
below elbow $1,710,000 $1,710,000 
Perrier v. Feinstein & others Penile implant infection $218,626 $218,626 
Gonzalez v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. & 
others Misdiagnosis of stroke: death $1,250,000 $1,255,000 j
Schlindler v. Lipshitz 
Prostatectomy & rectum puncture: 
eventual death $1, 262,748 $1, 262,748 
Macias v. St. Anthony Hosp Absence of lab work: baby later dies $1,500,000 $1,400,000 
Carroll v. Barrows & others 
Misdiagnosed eye cancer; toddler 
blind both eyes $7,962, 024 $2,000,000 k
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Notes: a: Loyola dismissed after settling for $100,000 before trial; plaintiff accepted Kim offer of policy limits 
during jury deliberations. b: Appealed, judgment affirmed. c: Two defendants settled before trial; setoff leaves 
on $4,000 judgment for costs.  d: High-low ($150,000-$950,000); e. High-low ($350,000-$800,000 during jury 
deliberations.  f. High-low agreement before verdict for policy limits of $1million for two defendants.  g. 
Reversed on appeal; remanded for new trial.  h: Post-trial settlement. i: High-low agreement ($500,000-

























 From the data in Table 3.5 a quick calculation will indicate that the 
mean (average) verdict was  $3,461,671. However, the last column in the table 
shows that at least seven of the verdicts were adjusted downward. The mean 
adjusted verdict when plaintiffs prevailed at trial was substantially lower, 
namely $1,465, 609, forty-two percent lower than the unadjusted figure.  
The downward adjustment is very likely a conservative figure since post-
trial settlements of awards may occur after the verdict reporter summaries are 
published. Additionally some settlements are kept confidential as a condition of 
settlement.  Nevertheless, the central finding from Table 3.5 confirms a view 
that the amount that the jury awards the plaintiff is frequently not the end of 
the story. The amount actually paid may be substantially less. 
 
Further Exploration of the 2001 Plaintiff Awards Involving $1 Million or 
Over  
Table 3.5 does not give much detail about the case and its outcome. In 
this section short summaries of the cases over  $1 million are presented. The 
summaries are from the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter, supplemented by 
research on Westlaw and Findlaw databases and calls to lawyers who 
represented parties in the case.48 Note again that the summaries do not allow 
an assessment of whether the jury verdict was correct or incorrect by some 
absolute standard as to either negligence or the amount of damages. In some 
instances the defense or plaintiff position regarding the claim is missing from 
the summaries. Some of the cases may still be on appeal and in others the case 
may have settled in the aftermath of the verdict.  Nevertheless, the summaries 
provide a perspective on what was at issue in the case. 
 
                                                 
48 In the footnotes below I report the court’s docket number and beginning date of trial taken 
from the data supplied by the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter. Unless otherwise noted the 
summary is taken from that source. In some instances the summary is supplemented from 
another source and this is noted as appropriate. In appealed cases the docket number of the 
appellate court is provided.  
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 Bryant v. La Grange Memorial Hospital, Kim, Nath and Loyola University 
Hospital49 involved a claim that in 1995 Dr. Kim was negligent in delaying a 
Caesarian section following signs of distress in the infant and that hospital 
employees also were negligent. The child suffered severe cerebral palsy and 
cannot walk or talk and is totally dependent but cognitively intact. The jury 
deliberated 7 hours and found only against Dr. Kim for $30 million. ($15 
million disability; $4 million pain and suffering; $4 million disfigurement; $5.5 
million for future medical expenses; $1.4 million for lost earnings and 
$116,700 for past medical expenses.  Loyola University hospital and its 
employee, Dr. Nath, settled for $100,000 prior to trial and the plaintiff accepted 
Dr. Kim’s offer of his $1 million policy limit during the jury’s seven hours of 
deliberations. The plaintiff subsequently appealed the verdict in favor of 
LaGrange Memorial Hospital but a unanimous opinion of the Third Division 
Appeals Court affirmed the verdict favoring LaGrange.50
 Lawler v. Lomont 51 involved a 1997 hysterectomy for cancer following a 
pathologist who misread Pap smears from 1994 through 1996, allowing stage 1 
cancer to spread.  The defense admitted liability but contested the likelihood of 
cancer reoccurrence and argued that the plaintiff had infertility problems 
before the surgery. The DuPage jury award of $3,800,000 ($2.5 million pain 
and suffering; $1.2 million loss of a normal life; $100,000 disfigurement) was 
appealed by the defendant, but the appellate court upheld the award.52 The 
case settled for the full amount of the verdict.53
 Munoz v Clemis, Garcelon and Health Care Service Corp 54 involved a 40-
year-old woman who claimed that her HMO physician and a second physician 
failed to perform a timely biopsy following complaints of hoarseness.  Due to 
delays the plaintiff lost confidence in her doctors and sought a new physician. 
The new physician diagnosed throat cancer. The plaintiff underwent surgery 
                                                 
49 96L-11679 (Tried July 16, 2001).  
50 Findlaw, Third Division, Illinois Court of Appeals, No.1-02-0518 (Dec 17,2003). 
51 99L-555 (Tried June 11, 2001) 
52 Ill. App. Ct., 2nd District, No. 2-01-1307 
53 Telephone call to plaintiff lawyer on May 5, 2005. 
54 2001 WL 34554111; JVR no. 412, 296. 
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that removed three-fourths of her voice box and required a tracheostomy. The 
jury returned a verdict of $2,495, 893  against all defendants , broken down as 
follows: $335,000 aggravation of pre-existing ailment or condition; $500,000 
disfigurement resulting from the injury: $500,000 past and future disability: 
$1,000,000 past and future pain and suffering; $108,593 medicals; and 
$52,300 lost wages. The HMO was found liable under a claim of vicarious 
liability.  (Prior to trial the plaintiff demanded  $3,200,000 and the defense 
offered  $41,000.) (The specialist physician to whom the plaintiff was referred 
by her primary physician was not mentioned in the trial summary and may 
have settled separately with the plaintiff prior to trial, but no further 
information could be obtained.) 
 Matthews v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital 55 involved the estate of a stillborn 
girl at 42 weeks gestation. The hospital admitted liability and the trial involved 
only the matter of damages for the parent’s “loss of society.” Reportedly, a 
judge recommended a settlement of $600,000 to $700,000 and counsel agreed 
but the parents refused preferring to have a jury decide the case. The jury 
awarded $3,781,392 ($1,875,000 for each parent’s loss of society plus $31,393 
for funeral and medical expenses). The defendant appealed the verdict, but the 
three-judge appeals court unanimously affirmed the verdict.56 Among other 
rulings, the appeals court ruled that the trial judge properly barred certain 
evidence because during discovery the defendant failed to disclose evidence 
requested by the plaintiff and ruled against a defense complaint about 
improper comments by the plaintiff’s lawyer in closing arguments because the 
defense did not object in a timely manner. The court further rejected a defense 
argument that the trial judge inappropriately admitted certain medical 
expenses.     
 
                                                 
55 97L-12643 (Tried June 12, 2001)  
56 Appellate Division, 1st District, 4th Division No.1-02-0853, 6 ARD 36.    
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 Bales v. Groya, and Community Orthopedics 57concerned a 33-year-old-
roofer who was injured in a fall and fractured his right lower leg. Surgery was 
performed but plaintiff claimed that a subsequent infection was improperly 
treated and the plaintiff was never hospitalized. A second surgery by another 
physician amputated the leg below the knee. The defense claimed the plaintiff 
had refused hospitalization after the infection developed. The jury awarded $2, 
812,553 ($750,000 for disfigurement, $100,000 for past loss of normal life; 
$350,000 for past pain and suffering; $150,000 for future pain and suffering; 
$200,000 for future medical expenses, $52,553 for past medicals and 
$500,000 for future lost lifetime earnings.) 
 Gonzales v. Pla 58 involved a claim that a primary care physician’s failure 
to diagnose kidney disease resulted in a 43-year-old male requiring a kidney 
transplant. The defendant argued at trial that his care was proper and that in 
any event the plaintiff would have required a kidney transplant and further 
that the plaintiff did not make a return visit to his office as instructed. The jury  
returned a verdict of $1,191,256 for the plaintiff.  However, during jury 
deliberations the parties made a high-low agreement ($150,000-$950,000) on 
the doctor’s $1 million liability policy. Thus the plaintiff received $950,000. 
 Waliczek v. Ghandhigutta and Alexian Brothers Medical Center59 involved 
the death of a 47-year-old construction worker who was hospitalized following 
a construction accident. The man had multiple fractures in his arms, wrists 
and legs, bleeding in the stomach and a small amount of bleeding in the brain. 
The plaintiff’s estate contended that the man was administered the blood 
thinning agent heparin intended for another patient. The defendants disputed 
both negligence and causation. On June 28, 2001 the jury rendered a verdict of 
$6,500,000. However, while the jury was deliberating the parties entered into a 
high-low agreement of $350,000-$800,000. 
 
                                                 
57 97L-12643 (Tried June 12, 2001) 
58 97L-9163 (Tried   January 11, 2001). 
59 2001 WL 34004686; ZARIN'S MEDICAL LIABILITY ALERT, Vol. 10, Issue 2. 97L-8110 (Tried June 
15, 2001) 
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 Skonieczny v. Gardner, Northwest Professional Obstetrics and Gynecology, 
Levy and Northwest Community Hospital 60 concerned a claim that a brachial 
plexus injury during delivery resulted in permanent loss of the use of the 
child’s left arm and shoulder plus the likelihood of future arthritis and pain. 
The plaintiff claimed that the obstetrician applied excessive traction to the 
baby’s head and that hospital nurses inappropriately pushed down on the 
mother’s stomach during delivery. The jury awarded $13, 298,052, but 
defendant Levy was found not liable. Defendants Gardner and Northwest 
Professional entered into a high-low agreement of $1 million to $2 million with 
the plaintiff before the verdict. Each defendant had a $1 million policy limit.  
  Christy v. Cavanaugh 61 involved a claim brought by the family of a man 
who died in 1997 from complications associated with Huntington’s Chorea, an 
incurable disease of the nervous system. The family contended that for seven 
years a psychiatrist had misdiagnosed the symptoms as due to depression, 
therefore preventing treatment that would have abated the man’s symptoms 
and mitigated the pain and suffering by the man and his family. They 
contended that the worsening symptoms should have resulted in a referral to a 
neurologist who would have conducted proper testing. The defendant denied 
negligence and contended that the physical manifestations typically associated 
with this rare disease were not noticeable in the patient. In May 2001 the jury 
awarded $2,500,000. 
Cork v. Cook County Hospital62 concerned a 12-year-old female who was 
admitted to the hospital in 1991 with a severe windpipe injury following a 
suicide attempt. She was discharged in stable condition but subsequently 
readmitted.  The lawsuit claimed that upon readmission following breathing 
difficulties, inexperienced hospital personnel attempted to intubate her at 
bedside rather than in an operating room. As a result, it was claimed, she was 
deprived of oxygen, suffered irreversible brain damage and died four days later. 
                                                 
60 98L-4578 (Tried May 7, 2001). 
61  2001 WL 1855179; ZARIN'S MEDICAL LIABILITY ALERT, Vol. 10, Issue 6. 98L-4578 (Tried May 7, 
2001). 
62  99L-14351 (Tried May 2, 2001).  
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The defense claimed the child died from pneumonia and other symptoms. A 
favorable plaintiff verdict was overturned. This was the second trial and the 
jury rendered an award of $5,300,000. However, on appeal in 2003 the First 
District Appellate Court, Fourth Division, again reversed and remanded the 
case for a third trial. A rehearing was denied in 2004.63   
 Simpson v. Allswede and Midwest Emergency Services, Ltd. 64 involved a 
claim that an emergency room physician used a wrong sized tube to intubate 
an eight- year-boy who was admitted with severe burns to his face and torso 
following explosion of an aerosol can. The plaintiff also claimed that the 
intubation was unnecessary because, despite the burns, there was no 
indication of difficulty in breathing or hoarseness. The tube remained in place 
for approximately a week. Ultimately the boy had to undergo a tracheostomy 
that remained in place for five years plus undergo three additional surgical 
resections. As a teenager the boy had made a good recovery and could speak 
normally and breathe easily.  On May 8, 2001 the jury returned a verdict of  
$2, 563,492 ($1.1 million for pain and suffering; $550,000 disfigurement; 
$650,000 for loss of a normal life; $263,492 for medical expenses). The case is 
reported elsewhere as settled post-verdict for $1,900,000.65
Cummings v. Suprenant, Midwestern University, and Olympia Fields 
Osteopathic Hospital 66 asserted that the plaintiff suffered excessive burns on 
his back from a fluoroscopy plus an increased risk of getting cancer. The 
defendant cardiologist contended that proper consent was obtained, that the 
exposure was limited, the radiation was in the appropriate amount and that 
the plaintiff was possibly unusually susceptible to radiation. The jury returned 
a verdict against the doctor for $1,250,000 ($500,000 medical expenses; 
$500,000 pain and suffering; $250,000 for disfigurement: $0 for disability). The 
                                                 
63  Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fourth Division , No. 1-02-1009 (December 11, 
2003); Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fourth Division No. 1-02 1009 ( February 26, 
2004). 
64  2001 WL 1855179; 10 ZARIN’S  MEDICAL LIABILITY ALERT 6:34 . 96-4608 consolidated with 
96L-4770 ( Tried April 30, 2001). 
65 Westlaw  WL 34395032, JVR No. 409, 786. 
66 97L-7658 (Tried March 27, 2001). 
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hospital was dismissed mid-trial in a $75,000 settlement that was set off 
against the verdict.  
 Salas v. Columbia Michael Reese Hospital, Organ, Podorovsky, Carranza 
and Leland 67 involved a wrongful death claim involving a two-year-old girl. The 
girl was developmentally delayed, had congenital heart disease and 
chromosomal defects. In January 1997, she developed respiratory distress and 
was admitted to Michael Reese Hospital because X-rays showed a collapsed left 
lung; she could not breathe without supplemental oxygen. A CT scan of poor 
quality suggested a tumor but a second scan was negative. The plaintiff’s 
family claimed  that surgery was a high risk because of the collapsed lung and 
pneumonia. They also claimed there was no informed consent for the 
procedure because the mother only signed consent for a 'mini-thoracotomy,' 
while the doctor  performed a standard thoracotomy. Also, plaintiff claimed 
that the anesthesiologist, should have used singular lung ventilation to protect 
against secretions.  The defense claimed surgery was necessary even if the CT 
scan was negative because the source of the compression needed to be 
diagnosed and that single lung ventilation was impractical on a 2-year-old. 
Following a fifteen-day trial the jury awarded $2,750,000 for  wrongful death 
against Michael Reese hospital, Organ and Podorovsky. Carranza was found 
not liable and Leland  received a directed verdict. The plaintiff had asked the 
jury for $15 million.  Post-trial motions were filed in this case but no additional 
information was available. 
 Guerin v. Yu and  Rush Prudential HMO 68is a case in which a mother 
gave birth by Caesarian section. The mother was discharged from the hospital 
but a post-partum examination showed excess bleeding. It was alleged that the 
defendant was negligent in failing to test the level of hemoglobin. She 
eventually was rushed to a hospital and underwent four surgeries to stop the 
bleeding but then developed Adult Respiratory Syndrome and died, survived by 
her husband and newborn child. The defense argued that the doctor’s actions 
                                                 
67  2001 WL 34030899; NATIONAL VERDICT REPORTER. 97L-1732 ( Tried Feb 20, 2001). 
68  96L-15058 ( Tried March 19, 2001). 
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were not the proximate cause of death. The jury awarded $7,622,040 against 
both defendants for survival pain and suffering ($1 million), medical and 
funeral expenses ($92,940), funeral expenses ($4,100), lifetime earnings 
($750,000)  loss of household services ($275,000) loss of society to husband 
($2.5 million)  and loss of society for newborn child ($2.5 million). During 
deliberations the parties entered into a high-low agreement ($500,000-$7 
million).  
 Banis v. Loyola University Hospital  and  Dobozi 69 involved a claim from a 
patient admitted to the hospital in a coma with several fractures, pulmonary 
contusion and a brain injury following an automobile accident .  The plaintiff 
asserted that hospital staff  did not check his forearm, which developed 
compartment syndrome and turned necrotic. All of the patient’s left forearm 
muscles had to be removed and all subsequent physicians had recommended 
amputating the arm below the elbow. The defense argued that the 
compartment syndrome is an extremely rare complication in such cases  and 
that the defendant’s comatose state made diagnosis of compartment syndrome 
difficult. The jury awarded $1,700,000 against both defendants for disability 
($570,000), disfigurement ($570,000) and pain and suffering (570,000). The 
case settled for the amount of the verdict.70
 Gonzalez v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital, Gonzalez, and Joshi 71 involved 
a male patient, age 61,  admitted to the hospital with symptoms consistent 
with a transient ischemic attack or stroke.  Following treatment and tests the 
man died. The plaintiff’s estate contended that the treatment deviated from the 
standard of care by  administering a blood thinner and not conducting 
sufficient tests to determine if hemmoraging might be taking place. The 
hospital admitted that it failed to communicate the results of tests but denied 
negligence, liability or the proximate cause of the man’s death.The physician’s 
denied a duty to contact the hospital for lab results and asserted that it was 
                                                 
69 97L-3408 ( Tried March 2, 2001) 
70 Telephone call to plaintiff lawyer on May 5, 2005. 
71 96L-14398 (Tried January 30, 2001). 
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reasonable to rely on the protocol of the hospital and its nursing staff.  The jury 
found the two doctors not liable but awarded $1,250,000  against the hospital: 
$1,250,000 for loss of society , but nothing for pain and suffering and 
disability. The case settled for $1, 255,000. 
 Schlindler v. Lipshitz 72 involved a prostatectomy on a man, age 71 in 
1995. During the procedure the man’s rectum was perforated. The error was 
immediately recognized and repaired. The patient was discharged without 
further tests. The man returned to the doctor’s office reporting that his stool 
was leaking into the incision. The doctor noted the man probably had a 
developing fistula and sent him home with instructions to take sitz baths and 
change back to a soft diet. At trial a plaintiff’s surgeon said that the man 
should have had a colostomy at that time. A colostomy was eventually 
performed and then reversed. However, the fistula reopened and the man died 
from complications. The defendant doctor asserted that all decisions that were 
made were judgment calls and within the standard of care. Further, the 
defendant contended that the decision to reverse the colostomy was solely that 
of the surgeon who performed it and the decision was the sole proximate cause 
of the subsequent injuries and death.  The defense made a high-low offer 
during jury deliberations of $15,000-$1,000,000 during jury deliberations (the 
summary is unclear as to whether the offer was accepted). The jury returned a 
verdict of $1, 262, 748 ( $600,000 for wrongful death , $462,748 for medical 
expenses; and $200,000 for survival pain).  
 Macias v. St. Anthony’s Hospital 73 involved a child born in 1995. Blood 
samples were drawn as required by the Illinois Department of Public Health. 
The newborn child was not feeding well and developed jaundice. She was 
admitted to another hospital , transferred to the University of Chicago Hospital 
where she died. At trial the evidence indicated that the blood samples were not 
received by the Illinois Department of Health lab until 13 days after they were 
drawn. The results indicated that the baby had a congenital metabolic defect 
                                                 
72 97L4830 (Tried February 2, 2001). 
73 97L-6675  (Tried January 30, 2001). 
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that , if detected, could have saved her life. The hospital argued that the 
samples were sent on a timely basis and that the child died from an unrelated 
influenza infection ( an opinion supported by the treating physician). The jury 
awarded $1,500,000 ($1 million for survival pain and suffering, $42,705 for 
medical expenses and $457, 295 for loss of society). The case was subsequently 
settled for $1,400,000. 
 Carroll v. Barrows, Barrows and Brown 74 was a lawsuit claiming that the 
defendants failed to properly diagnose abnormalities in the eyes of a child 
during seven visits during his first year of life. When the child was seen by the 
physician’s partner the abnormalities were detected and the child was referred 
to a specialist who detected signs of cancer. The child subsequently had 
radiation and chemotherapy treatments but eventually lost both eyes. The 
plaintiff’s experts testified that if the child’s condition had been diagnosed 
earlier there was a greater than fifty percent chance that vision could have 
been saved. The defense maintained that a pediatrician could miss the 
diagnosis if a portion of the eye was normal, that the patient’s form of cancer 
could not have been treated in any event and that an earlier diagnosis would 
not have changed the outcome. The jury awarded $7,962,024 against both 
defendants (1 million for disfigurement; $3.5 million for disability; 1 million for 
pain and suffering , $152, 224 for medical expenses  and $2, 309,800 for 
lifetime earnings). The case settled for the $2 million policy limits of the 
defendants.75  
 
Selected Defense Verdicts Involving Payments to Plaintiffs 
In Chapter 2 attention was drawn to the fact that even when plaintiffs 
lose against some defendants at trial they may nevertheless recover money 
from other defendants. Of the 72 defense verdicts there are some examples to 
illustrate this fact. 
                                                 
74 96L-13562  (Tried January 17, 2001). 
75 Confirmed by a phone message from the plaintiff’s lawyer to Vidmar on April 28, 2005 
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  Foley v. Lutheran General Hospital 76 involved a third trial in a case in a 
wrongful death lawsuit. The other two trials involved deadlocked juries in 
which a majority of jurors (11:1 in the first trial and 9:3 in the second trial) 
favored the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s estate claimed that in 1993  her bowel was 
perforated during a tubal ligation and she subsequently  became physically 
distressed and died from sepsis. Although the hospital’s policy was that their 
laboratory call a panic button when lab results showed a panic situation, the 
log book that would document a panic call was missing.  The defense argued 
that the most likely cause of death was a pulmonary embolism. The plaintiff 
was survived by her husband and two daughters, ages 4 and 7months. The 
jury sided with the defense in this third trial. However, the parties entered into 
a high-low agreement during deliberations of $1 million versus $5 million. The 
plaintiff’s estate thus received $1,000,000 from the hospital and $900,000 from 
another original defendant who settled with the estate before trial.   
 Marcial v. Michael and St. Anthony’s Hospital 77 involved a wrongful death 
claim from the estate of a 65-year old female who fell down stairs and was 
admitted to the hospital. The plaintiff’s estate asserted that the treating 
physician made a misdiagnosis of a pulmonary embolism and administered the 
blood thinner Heparin.The patient developed sepsis and died after 
approximately four weeks. The defense argued that the diagnosis was proper as 
was the treatment. Although the jury sided with the defendants, the parties 
had a high-low agreement of $50,000 -$1 million. The woman’s estate received 
$50,000 from the defendant plus a pretrial settlement with the hospital for 
$30,000. 
 Jones v. Jordan 78 involved a claim that the defendant was negligent in 
failing to diagnose meningitis in an 86 day-old child resulting in quadraplegia 
and severe mental retardation ( an IQ of about 30). The plaintiff claimed that 
the doctor recommended giving the child castor oil rather than examine the 
                                                 
76  95L-5339 (Tried  January 5, 2001). 
77  96L-50363 (Tried March 14, 2001). 
78 96L-13425 (Tried September 10, 2001).  
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child. Two persons corroborated the mother’s version of events. The doctor 
denied that he  recommended castor oil for a child under two and that even if a 
phone call of some kind had taken place the standard of care would not require 
that the child be seen immediately. The jury sided with the defense. In earlier 
proceedings the HMO that employed the treating doctor was dismissed from 
the lawsuit by the judge, but the summary judgment was reversed by the 
Illinois Appellate Court with an order for a new trial. Prior to the trial the HMO 
settled with the defendant for $1,700,000.  
 Gamboa v. Christ Hospital and Sternquist 79 was a lawsuit alleging that a 
premature baby fell out of an isolet in the intermediate care nursery and 
suffered a skull fracture. The child now has cognitive, speech and language 
deficits. The defense argued that its nurse complied with the standard of care, 
that the child suffered only superficial bleeding from the fall, and that the 
deficits were associated with his prematurity. The jury supported the claims of 
the defendants. Just before the jury rendered its verdict the parties entered 
into a high-low agreement of $1 million versus $3 million, resulting in the 
plaintiff receiving $1 million. 
 Thomas v. Habid and University of Chicago Hospital 80 was filed after a 
patient presented to the treating physician with a distended stomach and was 
treated for megacolon with several medications in 1994. The patient improved, 
but in 1995 was hospitalized with respiratory distress and other symptoms and 
was later found dead in the hospital’s commode. His estate claimed the cause 
of death was respiratory failure caused by pressure on his diaphragm and 
lungs from a megacolon. The defense countered that the patient died of an 
unrelated cardiac problem. The defendant physician was found not liable. 
However, the hospital was dismissed from the lawsuit after it settled for $1 
million at the start of trial.  
 
                                                 
79 96L- 2442 (Tried September 17, 2001). 
80 96L-6604 (Tried August 20, 2001). 
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 Allen v. Kirby and Harvey & Associates 81 involved a malpractice claim by 
a lawyer who alleged that he became blind after negligent treatment. In 1995 
she entered the emergency room of Columbus Hospital with complaints of 
severe headache and blurry vision. She was diagnosed with sinusitis, her 
personal physician was contacted  and the physician  prescribed an antibiotic 
and Tylenol #3 by phone. The patient became worse, the doctor advised her to 
discontinue the Tylenol and make an office visit the next day. Instead the 
patient went two days later to the emergency room at Nowrthwestern Memorial 
Hospital and was diagnosed with a blood clot that resulted in strangulation of 
the optic nerves. Plaintiff is now totally blind and needs a seeing eye dog.  The 
physicians who subsequently treated the patient and other experts testified 
that had she been diagnosed earlier, vision would have been saved. The jury 
found both defendants not liable, but there was a high-low agreement of 
$200,000 - $1,950,000  and thus the plaintiff received $200,000. 
 Brandonisio v. Kahan and Ob-Gyne Specialists 82involved a case in which 
an iliac artery was cut during a laproscopy. When bleeding occurred, open 
surgery was conducted to repair the injury. The plaintiff claimed ongoing 
numbness and weakness in her left leg as a result of the surgery. The defense 
argued that the injury was immediately recognized and they took proper 
corrective action. Although the jury sided with the defendants, a high-low 
agreement of $200,000-$1 million just prior to closing arguments resulted in a 
payment of $200,000.  
 Hanson v. Kanuri and Hinsdale Anesthesia Associates 83 concerned a 
claim that an anesthesiologist failed to take proper cautions involving a 63-
year–old man who had recently been taking Coumadin, a blood thinner prior to 
undergoing surgery on his spine. The man died. The defendant anesthesiologist 
contended that the surgeon was responsible because he had cleared the 
patient for surgery and in addition had failed to alert him of the need to 
                                                 
81 96L-9932, (Tried November 13, 2001). 
82 97L-16429 (Tried June 15, 2001). 
83 98L-1361 (Tried August 13, 2001); 
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terminate the anesthesia sooner because of excessive bleeding. The DuPage 
County jury found for the defendants. However, while the jury was deliberating, 
the parties reached a high-low agreement of $1 million versus $3 million, 
subject to a setoff for a pretrial settlement by Hinsdale Hospital. In short the 
plaintiff received $1 million despite losing at trial.  
 Goodman v. University of Illinois Hospital 84 is a case that ended in a 
hung jury with nine of the twelve jurors favoring the defendant.  A baby born 
with a congenital heart defect underwent corrective surgery in 1995, but a 
subsequent infection developed and he died in 1996. The defense argued that 
the surgical treatment was appropriate. During the jury selection for a second 
trial the case settled for $600,000.  
 Fleming v. Murphy 85 Involved a plaintiff who was admitted to Northwest 
Community Hospital for repair of an abdominal aortic aneurysm. Following the 
surgery the man became paraplegic, dependent on a wheelchair and leg braces. 
The defendant surgeon asserted that he met the standard of care and said that 
the paralysis is a known, though rare, complication of the surgery. The jury 
was deadlocked 10 to 2 and the case subsequently settled for $300,000. 
 Several other defense verdicts against doctors had pre- or mid-trial 
settlements of $25,000 by hospitals that had been named as co-defendants.  
 In Egenou v. Elahi and Weiss Memorial Hospital 86 the jury rendered a 
defense verdict in a case involving a claim that intubation left a woman in a 
vegetative state. The judge ordered a new trial. No other information about the 
case could be found.  
 
A Multi-Million Dollar Settlement in 2001 
 In addition to the above jury verdicts, there was a multi-million dollar 
settlement in 2001 that was reported for Cook County. Settlements are 
important because they reflect upon the costs incurred by medical providers 
                                                 
84 97L-16429 (Tried June 15, 2001). 
84 97L-3636 (Tried Feb 1, 2001). 
85 98L-11451 (Tried June 11, 2001). 
86 96L-12640 ( Tried Jan 2, 2001).  
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and their insurers. The case is probably an exceptional case, but it gives a 
glimpse of the less visible side of medical malpractice litigation in Illinois.  
  American National Bank and Trust v. Advocate Health and Hospitals, 
Corp.87 involved a settlement of $12,000,000 following the birth of triplets in 
1993. Two of the children were born with spastic cerebral palsy and brain 
damage; the third child, also suffering with cerebral palsy and brain damage, 
died in 1997. Of the $12 million total, $5.5 million was awarded for one child, 
$3 million for the second child, $2 million to the estate of the third child for 
wrongful death and $1.5 million to the parents of the children under the 
Family Expense Act. The claim was based on the assertion that the health care 
providers were negligent in not informing the parents of the risks of triplet 
pregnancies, failing to examine the mother on a timely basis when premature 
labor began and failure to provide appropriate medicines on a timely basis after 
delivery by Caesarian section. Lutheran General Hospital was self-insured and 
paid $2 million while St. Paul Insurance Company paid $10 million for the 
other two defendants.   
 
Cook and DuPage Jury Verdicts: 2002-2004 
 I also obtained data on jury verdicts in Cook and DuPage counties for 
2002, 2003 and 2004. The problem with these data for this report is that post-
verdict adjustments often take many months and are often not available in 
initial verdict reports. As demonstrated with the 2001 data, without these 
adjustments the verdicts can be quite misleading. As a consequence, I report 
only the frequency of jury trials and plaintiff win rates for the combined 
counties. 
 Table 3.6 reports the frequency of jury trials and plaintiff win rates for 
Cook and DuPage counties for 2001 through 2004. 
                                                 
87 2001 WL 34030866, 96L-05765 ( 2001). 
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Table 3.6: Jury Trial Frequency and Plaintiff Win Rates 
in Cook and DuPage Counties (Combined): 2001-2004 
 
Year Trial Win rate 
2001 99 30% 
2002 110 37% 
2003 99 36% 
2004 97 30% 
  
 The table shows that in 2002 trial frequency changed from 99 trials in 
2001 to 110 trials, an increase of 10 percent. The table also indicates that the 
plaintiff win rate jumped 7%. However, in 2003 frequency of trials returned to 
99 although plaintiffs win rate was 36%. In 2004 there were two fewer trials 
than in 2001 and the win rate returned to 30%.  In short, there is no evidence 
of increasing jury trials or increased win rates over the four-year period. 
Remember also that the trials in all of these years were based on lawsuits that 
on average were filed between three and six years earlier than the trial date. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 The statistics and case summaries presented in this section are 
compilations and case summaries collected by others and checked, where 
possible, against other sources. The summaries of the issues in the case may 
contain details or omissions that parties to the actual cases may contest. 
Nevertheless, the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter data appear to be generally 
accurate. With the one exception of National Bank and Trust, they speak only to 
outcomes of jury trials, which may constitute only ten percent or fewer of all 
malpractice claims during 2001 since the overwhelming majority of claims are 
settled without jury trials.88   
But since Cook and DuPage counties contain approximately one half of 
the population of Illinois and approximately two-thirds of its non-federal 
treating physicians and much of the debate about problems with the tort 
                                                 
88 See Vidmar et al, Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights 
from Florida, 54  DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 315(2005); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE 
AMERICAN JURY (1995) at pages 24-25.   
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system focus on jury decisions, some important findings emerge from the 
analyses. There was a modest increase in medical malpractice case filings 
between 1996 and 2004, but when adjusted for the growth in physicians who 
treat patients there is no evidence of a medical malpractice claims increase. 
The data from the federal Bureau of Statistics study raise questions about 
comprehensiveness but they do show no increase in jury trials between 1996 
and 2001.   
Jury verdict reports from the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter appear 
to be a comprehensive survey and provide more details about jury trials than 
other sources. These data show no increases in jury trials or in plaintiff win 
rates between 2001 and 2004.  
 Trial outcomes are a matter of judgment. The claims in many of the trials 
that are summarized involve very serious injuries or death. Trials occur when 
the plaintiff and the defendants cannot agree on legal liability or the amount of 
damages. Different readers could undoubtedly draw different opinions about 
the verdicts if they heard the same evidence that the jury heard.  
What we can draw from the findings is that in cases where plaintiffs 
prevailed, twelve citizens of the State of Illinois, some who voted Republican 
and some who voted Democrat, heard the evidence and unanimously agreed on 
a verdict. In the vast majority of the cases a trial judge agreed with the verdict 
and entered judgment. We can also draw a conclusion that the judgment was 
not always the final word. Sometimes a trial judge or an appellate court 
overturned the verdict. In other instances the parties settled for much less than 
the verdict. Some very large verdicts actually settled for the limits of the 
insurance coverage. In other instances the parties entered into high-low 
agreements before the verdict. Although the final settlements of some cases 
could not be determined, the post trial adjustments that were available indicate 
that the mean adjusted verdict was much less than the original verdict—in one 
instance, from $30 million to $2 million. The data also show that some 
plaintiffs who lost at trial against one or more defendants still ended up with 
large settlements from other defendants.      
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  The findings from Cook and DuPage counties account for high 
percentages of Illinois’ population and Illinois doctors. Can they be generalized 
to the rest of the state, especially if, as some have claimed, there are “judicial 
hellholes” in certain smaller Illinois counties? Chapter 4 turns to an 

















 A Close Look at Madison and St. Clair Counties and the Southern District 
of Illinois Federal Court 
Madison and St. Clair counties have been a center of controversy in the 
debate about medical malpractice and doctors’ liability insurance premiums. 
When President Bush visited Collinsville in January 2005, he blamed the 
problem on outsized jury awards. News reports suggest that doctors have left 
the area because of high malpractice insurance premiums, blaming the 
problem on jury awards. The American Tort Reform Association has labeled 
Madison County as a “judicial hellhole.” Much of the controversy involves large 
awards in class action asbestos cases. However, by inference, claims are made 
that there are also large awards in medical malpractice cases.  
As a consequence of the controversy, Madison and St. Clair counties and 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois were singled out for 
particular attention. The Westlaw and Lexis databases (which incorporate the 
Southwest Illinois Jury Verdict Reporter) were searched from 1992 through 2005 
for all medical malpractice verdicts in those venues. To supplement the 
summary descriptions contained in the verdict reporter I personally traveled to 
Edwardsville, Illinois and examined the actual court files for each of the 
identified cases. My goal was to check them for accuracy and to discover any 
other relevant facts.  
 
Madison County 
Table 4.1 presents a summary of jury verdicts involving claims of medical 
malpractice from 1992 through 2005.  
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Table 4.1 
Jury Verdicts in Medical Malpractice Cases: 
Madison County Court, 1992-2004 
 
Year Case Name Verdict Verdict Amount 
1992 Buie v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center Defense $0 
1992 Hungate v. Allendorph Defense $0 
1992 Brown v. Afuwape Defense $0 
1992 Marshall v. Harley Defense $0 
1993 Garcia v. Tulyasthien Plaintiff $600,000 
1993 Beets v. Mucci Plaintiff $332,000 
1993 Krause v. Greaves Defense $0 
1994 Fisher v. Friedman Plaintiff $350,000 
1994 Rives v. Hamilton Defense $0 
1995 Pruett v. Mucci Plaintiff $900,000 
1995 Holbert v. Malench Defense $0 
1996 Barnes v. St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center Plaintiff $402,000 $174,000* 
1996 Grant v. Petroff Defense $0 
1997 Finazzo v. Hill Defense $0 
1998 Lanz v. Chen Defense $0 
1999 Arnold v. Gittersonki Defense $0 
1999 Roberts v. Fernandez Defense $0 
2000 Adams v. Marrese Plaintiff $1,784,000 
2000 Knight v. Miller Defense $0 
2001 Lemons v. Dave Plaintiff $470,000 
2002 Wagoner v. Gingrich Plaintiff $75,000 
2002 Moffitt v. Skirball Defense $0 
2002 Jenkins v. Dai Defense $0 
2002 Terry v. Hamilton Defense $0 
2003 Budwell v. Freeman Plaintiff $25,000 
2005 Grant v. Petroff Defense $0 
 * Settled for  $174,000 versus verdict of $400,000 
 
Table 4.1 indicates there were 26 reported jury trials involving medical 
malpractice in Madison County from 1992 through 1995, an average of 1.7 
trials per year. Nine of the 26 trials ended with an award for the plaintiff, a win 
rate of 35 percent. The average award in those plaintiff wins was $523,333.  
One award (Adams) exceeded $1 million and another (Pruett) approached $1 
million. The awards in the table are not adjusted for inflation.  
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Plaintiff Verdicts Summarized 
Details about each of the plaintiff verdicts provide insights about the 
nature of the claim and its eventual settlement. These details do not speak to 
the issue of whether the case was decided properly. Additionally, in most 
instances I could not independently verify pre-trial settlement offers reported in 
the database. Further, in most instances, there were some exceptions; neither 
the verdict reporter nor the court file provided data on whether the case was 
finally settled for less than the jury verdict.89
Garcia v. Tulyasthien (1993)90 involved a claim of negligent surgery. The 
plaintiff, age 33, claimed that a surgeon negligently inserted a metal rod in his 
leg that was unnecessary, resulting in osteomyletitis, inflammation of the bone 
and marrow. His past medical costs were $2500 and his wage loss was 
$15,000.   
Beets v. Mucci (1993)91 concerned the wrongful death of a 34 year old 
mother of two children, ages 4 and 16. The patient had been treated for cervical 
cancer and her estate claimed that Dr. Mucci had failed to remove all the 
cancer during surgery. The jury verdict was $332,000. 
Fisher v. Friedman (1994)92 involved a claim that the physician failed to 
detect a detached retina and or refer the patient to a specialist. The claimed 
result was the loss of one eye; five separate surgeries to reattach the retina 
were not successful. The plaintiff claimed he was legally blind as a result. The 
defendant physician admitted liability. Presumably the jury trial was about the 
amount of damages. The plaintiff had demanded $750,000 before and during 
trial and the defendant offered $600,000.  The jury verdict was for $350,000, 
about 58 % of the defendant’s offer. The parties settled following the plaintiff’s 
post-trial motion for a new trial on damages.  
                                                 





Pruett v. Mucci and St. Anthony’s Hospital (1995)93 involved permanent 
neurological damage to the brain and spinal cord of a child during her mother’s 
labor. The plaintiff’s guardian alleged failure to monitor during delivery and 
inappropriate use of forceps.  The jury concluded that Dr. Mucci was an agent 
of the hospital. During trial the plaintiff demanded $750,000 to settle and the 
defendant offered $250,000. The jury verdict of $900,000 involved the following 
breakdown: past and future medical expenses, $200,000; past and future 
disability, $250,000; past and future disfigurement, $250,000; past and future 
pain and suffering, $200,000. The case settled for $875,000. Because the case 
involved a minor the court record contains a formal settlement distribution 
approved by a judge. $500,000 of the award was invested in an annuity to 
provide the plaintiff with a guaranteed annual income with graduated income 
amounts that would eventually provide $5600 per month for life (expected total 
lifetime yield from the annuity would be over $4 million) over the plaintiff’s 
lifetime. From the balance of $375,000, a lien (unspecified but likely Medicaid 
or a private insurer) of $28,000 for medical expenses was deducted. Expert fees 
and other litigation expenses amounted to slightly over $22,000.  Under Illinois 
fee structure the plaintiff’s lawyers received $281,000. The plaintiff received the 
net balance of $43,437.  
Barnes v. St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center (1996)94 involved a claim that the 
medical staff of the hospital had failed to provide antiseptic conditions following 
wrist surgery, had failed to monitor the infection, and negligence in 
transporting him in the hospital during which the patient’s arm was “rammed” 
into an elevator door, thereby pushing placement pins into a bone graft. As a 
consequence, the plaintiff contended, an infection developed and additional 
surgery was required. The treating physician was listed in the claim as having 
knowledge of the facts but was not listed as a defendant. The plaintiff claimed 
lost wages as well as medical expenses. The defense was based on the alleged 
failure to show a proximate cause for the injuries. After the jury verdict of 




$402,000 the plaintiff requested the judge to increase the judgment because 
the defense counsel had improperly mentioned in closing arguments that the 
plaintiff’s $96,000 in medical costs were paid by insurance, thereby causing 
the jury to deduct those expenses from the award. Approximately six weeks 
after the verdict the trial judge entered a judgment, reducing the final award to 
$228,000 on the grounds that the plaintiff’s claims of wage loss were “too 
speculative.” Shortly thereafter the parties settled the case for $174,000.  
Adams v. Mareese (2000)95 involved a claim by a 29-year-old man that in 
1992 the defendant performed three unnecessary fusion surgeries to the man's 
neck requiring a fourth corrective surgery with an internal fixation. The alleged 
result was a complete loss of range of neck motion, chronic pain, permanent 
disability and inability to work for the remainder of his life. The claim involved 
$91,000 in past medical expenses, approximately $140,000 in past wage loss 
and approximately $400,000 in future wage loss. The defendant denied the 
claims of negligence, stating that the original surgeries were necessary.  The 
jury awarded the plaintiff $1,784,000 divided as follows: $140,000 for past 
wage loss; $400,000 for future wage loss; $90,000 for past medical expenses, 
and $1,154,000 for disability, disfigurement and pain and suffering. The trial 
judge affirmed the verdict and in the judgment  commented on judicial 
restraint “in response to defendant’s evasive answers, unsolicited elaborations, 
and assorted courtroom shenanigans.” (judgment, page 26). The judgment 
further noted that the defendant was chastised out of the presence of the jury 
but threatened with chastisement in front of the jury for this behavior 
(judgment, page 25). The defendant appealed to the 5th District Appellate Court 
and then to the Illinois Supreme Court, but the appeals were denied (204 Ill.2d 
655, 792 N.E.2d 305, 275 Ill. Dec. 74, June 4, 2003).  
 
                                                 
95 98-L-858 
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Lemons v. Dave (2001)96 involved a claim of wrongful death for failure to 
diagnose and treat bladder cancer in a timely manner; the delay of 25 months 
allegedly resulted in a premature death. The mother of four children was 58 
years old at the time of her death.  The jury verdict was as follows: medical 
expenses medical $70,000; pain and suffering, $250,000; husband of the 
deceased, $50,000 for loss of money,services, society, and sexual relations; the 
estate value of wife’s services, $50,000; reasonable society and loss of 
companionship and sex, $50,000. Judgment affirming the jury verdict was 
made on Dec 7, 2001. The verdict reporter notes that the plaintiff’s estate 
reached a confidential settlement with another defendant named in the lawsuit, 
suggesting that more money was recovered than reflected in the verdict. 
Wagoner v. Gingrich (2002)97 involved a claim of a birth injury to the 
shoulder and arm resulting in Erb’s palsy (nerve damage) and partial loss of 
use of right arm. Medical specials were $5000. The defendant denied 
negligence. Testimony indicated that, otherwise, the child was developing 
normally.  The jury awarded $75,000. 
Budwell v. Freeman (2003)98 involved a claim by a woman in her late 
thirties that the defendant performed a scheduled tubal ligation after child 
birth, but the incision for the tubal ligation was made too close to an existing 
umbilical hernia, causing post-operative complications resulting in an infection 
in her abdomen for about 18 months, multiple corrective surgeries, permanent 
abdominal scarring and pain and suffering. Medical expenses were claimed to 
be approximately  $12,000 and wage losses between $6,000 to $7,000. The 
jury verdict was for $25,000. 
 
Three Other Cases That Were Not Medical Negligence Verdicts  
It is important to draw attention to the fact that three other awards were 
identified that involved medical malpractice plaintiffs. In 1992 a Madison 





County case, Bloome v. Wiseman 99involved a legal malpractice award of 
$3,238,000. The case concerned a lawyer who failed to properly represent a 
patient involved in a malpractice lawsuit. The trial judge reduced the award to 
$2.6 million, reflecting an assessment that the plaintiff had potential medical 
damages of that amount. Robeen v. Walgreens100 involved a pharmacy error 
that resulted in a person having seizures resulting in a jury verdict of  $50,840. 
In Hess v. Madison County Nursing Home101 in 2001 the estate of an eighty-
seven-year old patient sued for burns resulting from hot tea and received  an 
award of $14,000. A doctor was originally named in the suit but was dismissed 
as a defendant before trial. 
 
A Settlement Case 
 Resser v. Chand (1997)102  involved a claim that the defendant  
attempted but failed to complete a colposcopy examination and subsequently 
ordered surgery and  performed an extensive conization which virtually 
amputated the cervix. Plaintiff had significant abdominal pain after the 
procedure and upon a return visit was first told of the type of surgery 
performed, attributing the pain to the internal sutures. Plaintiff underwent a 
laparoscopic examination and dilation of the cervical canal but continued to 
experience  uterine bleeding. Subsequently, plaintiff sought another opinion 
from a different doctor who recommended a total hysterectomy and performed 
such. The  plaintiff claimed defendant breached the standard of care by 
performing a conization, which was inappropriate for the abnormal PAP test 
and contended that defendant misdiagnosed her condition as severe dysplasia 
when the post-operative pathology report indicated no dysplasia was present. 
Plaintiff claimed defendant also failed to type the HPV virus to determine 
whether it was a specific species, which is a precursor of cancer and that the 
defendant  failed to obtain her informed consent for the conization procedure. 






The plaintiff further contended that the defendant falsified and/or negligently 
altered medical records to reflect plaintiff’s informed consent. The case settled 
for $275,000. 
      
St Clair County 
St. Clair County jury verdicts are contained in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2: St. Clair Jury Verdicts 1993-2003 
 
Year Case name Verdict Verdict Amount 
1993 Holten v. Memorial  Hospital Plaintiff $8,816,500 
Retriala
1993 Taylor v. Murphy Defense $0 
1994 Smith Defense $0 
1995 Karr v. Tschoe Defense $0 
1995 Eggemeyer v. Metropolitan Ref 
Labs and Simons 
Plaintiff    $0 b
1996 Earle v. Diehl Defense $0 
1996 Abbitt v. Price Defense $0 
1997 McClure v. Ramon Defense $0 
1997 Restoff v. S.Ill. Surgical 
Consultants 
Defense $0 
1998 Eck v. Prosser Defense $0 
1999 Trentman v. Associated 
Orthopedic Surgeons 
Defense $0 
2002 Sherrod  v. Ramaswami Plaintiff $250,000 c
2003 Mcginnis Defense $0 
2003 Cretton v. Protestant Memorial  
Medical  Center 
Plaintiff    $0 d
  
Notes: a. Reversed and remanded by Ill. S. Ct but another defendant settled pre-trial 
$2,950,000; b. Doctor not liable but $550,000 against hospital for “slip and fall;” c. Also 
a civil rights claim with $150,000 in compensatory and punitive damages; d. Not 
medical negligence but $950,000 against hospital for “slip and fall.” 
  
 The table shows one very large verdict of over $8 million that was 
reversed by an appeals court, but the note draws attention to the fact that 
another defendant in the case settled before trial for $2,950,000. Details are 
reported in the next section. There was one other medical malpractice verdict 
for $250,000. The notes to the table indicate that in two other cases doctors 
were sued along with other parties but were found not liable for medical 
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negligence but co-defendants were found liable on other grounds and 
substantial damages were awarded. Details are provided in the next section. It 
is noteworthy that the juries in these latter cases were clearly capable of 
making distinctions between malpractice versus other claims. 
 Similar to Madison County, there is no evidence of runaway juries in 
medical malpractice cases, especially over the last decade.   
 
Plaintiff Verdicts Summarized 
 Holten v. Memorial Hospital (1993)103 claimed a hospital failed to properly 
diagnose her condition She  alleged that in 1990, she was admitted to 
Memorial Hospital  emergency room with complaints of numbness and tingling 
in her lower extremities. She alleged that  on the following day, the numbness 
and tingling progressed to paralysis which was not noticed by the nurses on 
the ward who took care of her. Plaintiff contended that  two days after 
admission, she was paralyzed in her lower extremities; the defendant had failed 
to properly diagnose her condition and administer treatment before her 
condition worsened. Memorial hospital asserted that her condition was 
properly diagnosed at that time as being the result of a blood clot or circulation 
failure in the spine. Further, in a cross claim Memorial alleged that the treating 
physician had incorrectly diagnosed her condition to be caused by cancer, had 
treated her for cancer and failed to properly treat an infection in her spine 
which lead to the worsening of her condition. The jury awarded $8,706,500 to 
the plaintiff and her spouse received $110,000. The trial judge agreed with the 
verdict on liability but reduced the award by $1,500,000. Next the appellate 
court afirmed the judgment on liability but reduced the award to $4,366,500. 
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and ruled that the evidence 
supported the jury’s determination that the failure of the hospital staff to report 
the progression of the patient’s paralysis was a proximate cause of her 
paralysis. However, the Court further concluded that the trial court’s stated 
belief that a defense witness had been led by defense counsel to testify falsely 
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and the plaintiff counsel’s prejudicial remarks during closing arguments  
charging attorney misconduct  denied the hospital a fair trial. In addition the 
Court ruled that a jury instruction on aggravation of an injury caused by 
another tortfeasor’s (the surgeon) negligence should not have been given and 
that another instruction on proximate cause should not have been given. The 
case was reversed and  remanded back to the original trial court. No further 
information could be found about the case, possibly indicating it settled.  
However, it is noteworthy that a co-defendant, the plaintiff's treating 
neurosurgeon, settled with plaintiff before trial for $2,950,000. Additional on-
line research uncovered no evidence of a retrial or a settlement involving 
Memorial Hospital.  
 Cretton v. Protestant Memorial Center (1993)104 involved a wrongful death 
claim by the estate of a security guard, age 63, suffering from chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease and emphysema. The plaintiff’s estate claimed 
that Cretton told her daughter after the transfer from one hospital unit to 
another that, while she was being put in her bed,  nurses had her stand on her 
own, and she fell. She subsequently died and the coroner concluded that death 
was caused by  an injury to her brain. The defense contested the coroner’s 
finding, claiming that the patient died of respiratory failure. The jury found 
that Cretton's death was not caused by medical negligence on the part of the 
hospital, but that the fall was, and awarded $950,000. The plaintiffs sought 
noneconomic damages for the three days between Cretton's transfer and her 
death, and for the loss of society, guidance, and support to her heirs. 
 
Medical Malpractice and a Civil Rights Violation 
 Sherrod v. Ramaswami and Shroff (2002)105 is an unusual case. The 
plaintiff was a convicted rapist who complained of abdominal pain and was 
diagnosed with suspected appendicitis but the doctors did not take timely 
additional action for over two weeks despite many complaints of severe pain by 




the man. Eventually a surgeon operated and found a ruptured appendix with 
gangreen having spread to the intestines. The surgeon had to remove the 
appendix, four inches of  small intestine, three inches of large intestine and the 
cecum, leaving the patient with a large scar and a risk of future intestinal 
blockage. In addition to medical malpractice the plaintiff claimed a civil rights 
violation. The jury awarded $250,000 for medical malpractice, $100,000 
compensatory damages and $50,000 against Dr. Ramaswami , but found 
defendant Shroff not liable.  
 
A Settled Case 
Eggemeyer v. Metropolitan Reference Laboratories and Simmons (1995)106 
alleged an unnecessary mastectomy, pain and suffering by the laboratory 
defendant and  a physician. The patient was about 50 years old sought 
treatment for a suspicious lump in her breast. A biopsy was performed but a 
courier for the laboratory failed to deliver the specimen or the laboratory 
misplaced it. Plaintiff alleged the doctor reviewed her options, which ranged 
from monitoring her condition to a prophylactic mastectomy. A second biopsy 
was not an option because virtually all suspicious tissue was removed. At some 
point, the doctor relocated his practice and plaintiff sought another opinion. 
Since plaintiff had a family history of breast cancer, the second doctor was very 
concerned about an undiagnosed cancer and plaintiff decided to undergo a 
modified radical mastectomy. However, after the procedure it was found that 
there was no cancer present. Before trial the laboratory settled for $500,000 
and the physician settled for $50,000. 
 
Federal Cases In the Southern District of Illinois 
 Medical malpractice cases end up in federal rather than state courts 
under two main circumstances. One circumstance is when one of the parties to 
a lawsuit resides in another state; the case may be moved to a federal court 
under “diversity” jurisdiction. The second circumstance is when the defendant 
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is a federal agency, such as a VA hospital or a military hospital. However, 
under this second circumstance the Federal Tort Claims Act requires that the 
case be decided by a judge rather than by a jury.  
  Table 4.3 presents medical malpractice verdicts reported for federal 
court of the Southern District of Illinois (located in East St. Louis).  
 
Table 4.3 Federal Court Jury Medical Malpractice Verdicts, 
Southern District of Illinois: 1992- 2003 
 
Year Case Name Verdict Amount 
1993 Taylor Defense $0 
1994  Ridenour v. Muller Defense $0 
1995 Cripps v. Union Pacific 
and Heshmatpour 
Plaintiff $375,000 
1995 Haas v.  Group Health 
Plan 
Plaintiff $100,000 
1996 Kaufman v. Cserny Defense $0 
1997 Mandrell Defense $0 
2001 Treadway Defense $0 
2003 Mize Defense $0 
 
 
Table 4.3 shows that since 1992 there have been two plaintiff verdicts 
from federal court juries involving claims related to medical malpractice. There 
was an additional verdict involving a brain-injured child that resulted in a 
verdict of $19,253,549. It was major news, but as explained below, it did not 
involve a jury verdict. 
 
Plaintiff Verdicts Summarized 
Cripps v. Union Pacific and Heshmatpour(1995)107 involved a railroad worker 
who was injured on the job and alleged permanent nerve damage to his left 
elbow and inability to return to his job.. He alleged that the physician had been 
negligent in performing surgery after a work injury. The defendant contended 
that he had met the standard of care. Union Pacific was a defendant as part of a 
“loan receipt agreement” called a “Mary Carter” agreement after a 1967 case 
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involving a defendant , Mary Carter Paint Company. The verdict was for 
$1,500,000 for the plaintiff against Union pacific and $175,000 against the 
physician. From the $375,000 Union Pacific received $225,000 and the plaintiff 
received an additional $155,000.  Under the agreement Union Pacific paid 
nothing to the plaintiff.  
Haas v. Group Health Plan (1995) 108 involved a 45–year-old female plaintiff 
who went for an ear cleaning. Her eardrum was perforated resulting in 
temporary hearing loss and permanent high frequency loss. The plaintiff’s case 
was based on the legal theory of res ipsa loquitur, that is, the injury speaks for 
itself. The award was $100,000. 
 
Trial by Judge Alone 
Coleman v. United States of America and Touchette Regional Hospital (2003) 
109 involved a claim against a physician considered a federal employee of the 
United States. The plaintiff’s mother alleged that during the birthing process the 
physician attempted to apply a vacuum extractor to the baby’s head about 15 
times rather than the manufacturer’s recommendation of no more than three 
times. The result was severe brain injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff further 
alleged that although a Caesarian Section was eventually performed it should 
have been performed much earlier. The physician denied that fifteen attempts 
were made with the vacuum extractor and claimed the injury was due to an 
arrest of labor and the injury was attributed to an infection contracted by the 
mother. Defendant Touchette Regional Hospital was dismissed from the suit 
before trial. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the trial was by judge alone and 
resulted in a verdict of  $19,253,549. The plaintiff reportedly had offered to settle 
for $8 million before trial and the defendant’s last offer was reported as $3.1 
million. After a search of federal court cases in Westlaw no appeal of the verdict 
could be found.    
 





Over a 14-year period only 11 jury verdicts favoring the plaintiff were 
uncovered in Madison and St. Clair county courts involving medical malpractice. 
Only two verdicts exceeded one million dollars although a third for $900,000 
approached one million. As with cases summarized in Chapter 3, different 
persons can draw opposing conclusions about whether even the relatively few 
plaintiff awards were justified, but in any event there is no evidence to support 
the perception that medical malpractice jury trials in these counties are frequent 
and outrageous in their generosity to plaintiffs.   
 The data reported in this chapter do not speak to settlements resulting in 
payments without resort to jury trial. Research in other jurisdictions indicates 
that settlements outnumber jury trials by about nine settlements to one trial. 
The public debate has been about jury verdicts, however.   
The reputation of these two counties has been affected by the linking 
controversy over asbestos litigation and medical malpractice litigation in mass 
media reports and the claims of tort-reform proponents. The reputation may 
have been further enhanced by media accounts of the very large award in the 
Coleman case in the Federal Court. The case was decided by a federal judge, not 
a jury.  
The central conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is this: Insofar as 
medical malpractice litigation is concerned, the reputation of Madison and St. 








Caps on Pain and Suffering 
 One of the central proposals for tort reform in medical malpractice 
involves a cap of $500,000 on the pain and suffering component of awards. 
One source, without documentation, reported that non-economic damages 
“…now make up more than 90 percent of the money awarded by Illinois 
juries.”110  
This chapter returns to the jury awards from Cook and DuPage counties 
presented in Chapter 3 to examine issues related to “pain and suffering.” Its 
intent is to provoke deeper thought about the pain and suffering component of 
awards. Fundamental changes in tort law should not be taken lightly and 
without such consideration.  
The data in Chapters 3 and 4 have challenged some widely held 
assumptions about jury awards, and the data in Chapter 6 will offer an 
additional challenge, namely that the evidence of doctors fleeing Illinois is not 
supported by any reliable data and in fact is contradicted by statistics collected 
by the American Medical Association.  
 
Re-Examining Cook-DuPage Jury Awards in 2001 
 Table 5.1 describes all 30 plaintiff verdicts from Cook and DuPage 
counties in 2001. In most cases, although not all, the summary from the Cook 
County Jury Verdict Reporter described the various elements that made up the 
damage award, including the pain and suffering component. The summaries 
allow us to make a rough estimate of what the verdict would have been if the 
judge had been required to reduce the pain and suffering component of the 
award to $500,000. Recall also, that in a number of cases the settlement was 
less than the verdict due to high-low agreements, settlements for the amount of 
the liability insurer’s coverage, or for other reasons.  
                                                 
110 Steve Stanek, Doctors Flee Illinois, HEALTH CARE NEWS, April 1, 2004.  
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The first column reports the case. The second column is the jury verdict. 
The third column reports any adjustment to the verdict that the judge would 
have applied if the pain and suffering component of the award exceeded 
$500,000. The fourth column reports any known settlement amount that 
differed from the verdict. The remaining columns report the itemized verdict 
elements. The pain and suffering component of the award is in the fourth 
column, allowing the reader to see how much the jury award differed from the 
$500,000 cap.  
Table 5.1: Estimating Effects of a $500,000 Cap on Pain and Suffering 











Bryant $30,000,000  $26,500,000  $1,100,000  $4,000,000  $ 16, 476,000 $4,000,000      
Lawler $3,800,000   $1,800,000   $2,500,000    $100,000  $1,200,000    
Brewster $170,000      $150,000  $20,000        
Asceves $467,000        $32,900        
E. Munoz $2,495,893  $1,870,000    $1,000,000  $887,300  $500,000      
D. Munoz $150,000    $0  $100,000    $50,000      
McNamara $317,000      $280,000  $37,000        
Matthews $3,781,393        $31,393      $3,750,000  
Genovese $494,906      ?? ??       
Willis $120,608      ?? ??       
Bales $2,812,553      $500,000  $715,723  $750,000  $800,000    
Washington $200,000      $100,000    $100,000  $0    
Gonzales $1,191,256  $1,091,256  $950,000  $600,000  $141,256    $450,000    
Walisczek $6,500,000    $800,000  ?? ??       
Stajsczyk $801,643        $1,643      $800,000  
Thomas $835,000        $835,000        
Matei $525,000      ?? ??       
Skonieczny $13,298,052    $2,000,000    $298,052        
Christy $2,500,000  $2,000,000    $1,000,000      $1,000,000   $500,000 
Cork $5,300,000    $0            
Simpson $2,563,492  $1,963,492  $1,900,000  $1,100,000  $263,492  $550,000  $650,000    
Cummings $1,250,000      $500,000  $500,000  $250,000      
Salas $2,750,000                
Guerin $7,622,040  $7,122,040  $7,000,000  $1,000,000  $1,622,040      $5,000,000  
Banis $1,710,000  $1,640,000    $570,000  $570,000  $570,000      
Perrier $218,626      $100,000  $68,626  $50,000  $0    
Schlindler $1,262,748      $200,000  $462,748      $600,000  
Macias $1,500,000  $1,000,000    $1,000,000  $42,705      $457,295  
Carroll $7,962,024  $7,462,024  $2,000,000  $1,000,000  $5,962,024  $1,000,000      
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  Column 3 in the table shows that the cap would have reduced the jury’s 
verdict in ten of the 30 cases: Bryant, Lawler, E. Munoz, Gonzales, Christy, 
Simpson, Guerin, Banis, Macias, and Carroll.  But wait. Look at column 4.  
Bryant settled for $1,100,000, far less than jury’s award for economic damages. 
The cap made no difference in the settlement outcome. Similarly, Gonzales 
settled for less than the cap adjustment. So did Simpson, Guerin and Carroll.  
 Thus, five cases of the 30 would have been affected by the caps: Lawler, 
E. Munoz, Christy, Banis, and Macias. The verdicts in Munoz, Christy, and 
Macias would have been $500,000 less. In Banis the cap would have reduced 
the jury’s award by $70,000. Lawler resulted in the biggest reduction, namely 
$2 million.  
 In some cases, the breakdown of the elements of the verdict was not 
reported and these are noted with question marks, but the total verdicts of 
these cases were, in any event, below the $500,000 limit of the proposed cap.  
 Readers may note that in addition to medical and income losses, jury 
verdicts described in Table 5.1 also included damages for disfigurement, loss of 
a normal life, loss of society, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. Under 
Illinois law these elements of damages have important economic consequences 
bearing on claims even though there is no fixed metric by which the amounts 
can be assessed. The determination of amounts is left to the jury under the 
supervision of the judge.111   
 Recognition of the economic component to so-called “non- economic 
damages” is a common source of confusion about “pain and suffering.”112 Pain 
and suffering is only one component of “non-economic” damages. In some 
states and textbooks, alternative terms of “special” and “general” damages are 
                                                 
111 See generally, Ill. Pattern Jury Instr.-Civ. 30.04.03 (2005 ed.); Ill. Pattern Jury Instr.-Civ. 
34.02 (2005 ed.); WEST'S SMITH-HURD ILLINOIS COMPILED STATUTES ANNOTATED and 
cases cited in the annotations.   
CHAPTER 740. CIVIL LIABILITIES, ACT 180. WRONGFUL DEATH ACT, 180/1. Action for 
damages 
112 For more discussion see, Neil Vidmar, Felicia Gross and Mary Rose, Jury Awards For 
Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW 265 
(1998). 
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used. This partially avoids the problem of conflation of pain and suffering with 
other kinds of damages, such as described above. In short, the claim in one 
mass media report that more than 90 percent of Illinois jury awards are for 
“non-economic” damages 113 might be true—better data would be needed—but 
this does not mean that 90 percent of jury awards in medical malpractice cases 
are for pain and suffering.  
Indeed, although data are missing for breakdowns of damages in some 
cases, a very rough estimate of the proportion of the total awards that pain and 
suffering represented in the cases reported in Table 5.1 can be obtained 
dividing the total of the pain and suffering (column 5) by the total of the jury 
verdicts (column 2). By this rough calculation “pain and suffering” constitutes 
only 15% of verdicts. Perhaps if the missing data were known and added in, the 
percentage would be higher.  But even if the missing information doubled the 
figure - an unlikely projection - the percentage would be a far cry from 90%.    
 Recall that, as discussed in Chapter 2, jury verdicts constitute ten 
percent or less of all payments to claimants. Recall also that Cook and DuPage 
counties contain half of Illinois’ population and two-thirds of its doctors and 
that the data show that Madison and St. Clair counties yield jury verdicts less 
or equal to Cook and DuPage counties, so it is reasonable to assume that these 
findings can be generalized to all of Illinois. One conclusion to be drawn from 
the above discussion is that a $500,000 cap on pain and suffering, while 
significantly decreasing awards to some individual plaintiffs, would have 
minimal impact on overall payments to claimants in medical malpractice in 
Illinois. 
 Some might argue that the above conclusion does not consider the 
“shadow effect” of jury verdicts. No direct answer can be given to this claim. 
However, given the likely minimal impact that a $500,000 cap would have on 
jury verdicts, this claim would not appear to have much logical substance.114   
                                                 
113 Steve Stanek, Doctors Flee Illinois, HEALTH CARE NEWS, April 1, 2004  
114 Research on malpractice liability insurer files from North Carolina led researchers to 
conclude that insurers and defense lawyers settle cases primarily on the basis of their own 
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 It is important to note here that a study conducted by the U.S. 
Government Accounting Office in 2003 studied four states with pain and 
suffering caps of $250,000, four states with caps of $500,000 and 11 states 
without such caps.115 The study found that while medical liability insurance 
premiums increased in all states, they were lower in states with caps, as were 
claims payments. On the other hand the GAO also qualified the findings: 
“Moreover, differences in both premiums and claims payments are also affected 
by multiple factors in addition to damage caps, and we could not determine the 
extent to which differences among states were attributable to the damage caps 
or to additional factors.”  
As the GAO report properly recognized, there are multiple factors that 
influence premiums and claim payments, and it is often impossible to separate 
causes or the contribution of separate factors to outcomes, such as claims and 
premiums.  
A report by Weiss Ratings, a respected insurance analyst, found that 
caps on pain and suffering reduced the amounts recovered by plaintiffs but did 
not result in insurers reducing doctors’ insurance premiums.116  
In 2003 GE Medical Protective Company, the nation’s largest medical 
malpractice insurer, reported to the Texas Department of Insurance as follows: 
“Non-economic damages are a small percentage of total losses 
paid. Capping non-economic damages will show loss savings of 
1.0%.”117
                                                                                                                                                             
internal assessments of whether the standard of care was violated, Ralph Peeples, et al., The 
Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37, WAKE FOREST 
LAW REVIEW 877 (2002). Research by Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and 
Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MEDICINE 1780 (1992) on medical malpractice cases in New Jersey is also consistent with this 
view. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1993) at 89-113, conducted research on 
closed claims in Florida that also is supportive of such a conclusion.  
115 GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE , GAO-03-836 (2003) 
116 See MARTIN D. WEISS, WEISS RATINGS, INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE IMPACT OF 
NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS AND AVAILABILITY OF 
COVERAGE  7-8 (2003) available at http://www.weissratings.com/malpracticecap.asp. 
117 See http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/rp/rp004689.pdf.  
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The company also said that a provision in the Texas law allowing for 
periodic payments of awards would provide a savings of only 1.1%. Medical 
Protective eventually raised the rates on its physician policyholders. 
 Table 5.1 and the discussion associated with it cannot provide a definite 
answer as to whether a $500,000 cap on pain and suffering would have an 
effect on claim payments and ultimately a secondary effect on doctors’ liability 
insurance premiums, but it raises important questions about whether a cap 
would be effective. It also begs questions of fairness. 
 
Fairness Considerations:  Two Studies on the Effects of Caps 
It is important to consider two additional studies. They address the issue 
of the fairness of caps and raise questions about justice for claimants. In the 
medical malpractice tort reform debate, most of the rhetoric on both sides has 
addressed the plight of doctors and liability insurers and the potential 
implications for availability of health care. Little of the discussion has 
addressed the plight of persons who are injured by medical negligence and 
make claims.118  
Research by Lucinda Finley has examined the consequences of caps on 
the allocation of plaintiff recoveries in California, Florida, and Maryland by 
looking at jury verdicts and calculating the discrepancy between what the jury 
awarded and the amount the plaintiff would recover under caps.119 She found 
that the major effects would fall most heavily on children, women, and elderly 
people because their losses are more likely to be non-economic losses, albeit 
often devastating and tragic.   
David Studdert and his colleagues conducted a study of California jury 
verdicts to assess the impact of California’s $250,000 cap on non-economic 
damages and concluded as follows:  
                                                 
118 See Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, the 
Contingency Fee System, Juries and Social Policy, LOYOLA LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW (2005, in 
Press). 
119  Lucinda Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 1263, 1281, 
1286, 1308-1312 (2004). 
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Plaintiffs with the most severe injuries appear to be at highest 
risk for inadequate compensation. Hence, the worst-off may 
suffer a kind of “double jeopardy.”  
 
Analysis of proportional reductions shows that the burden of 
caps tends to fall on injuries that cause chronic pain and 
disfigurement but do not lead to declines in physical 
functioning that would generate lost work time or high health 
care costs…. Notwithstanding their limited economic impact, 
the injuries involved are by no means trivial.120
The findings from these two studies raise questions about the fairness of 
caps on negligently injured persons. Perhaps some readers will conclude that 
these are less important considerations in overall health care policy, but it 
seems important to raise them.  
To consider these fairness issues further, readers may wish to turn back 
to the summaries of some of the cases reported in Chapter 3. In Carroll v. 
Barrows a child in his first year of life had undiagnosed eye cancer. Despite 
radiation and chemotherapy treatments he eventually lost sight in both eyes. 
The jury awarded him $1 million for pain and suffering. In Simpson v. Allswede 
improper intubation of an eight-year-old boy resulted in a tracheostomy 
followed by 30 surgical procedures. The traceostomy was in place for five years, 
preventing him from speaking and at 16 has permanent throat damage, 
although he can now speak. The jury awarded $1.1 million for pain and 
suffering.  In Gonzales v. Pla  a doctor failed to diagnose kidney disease in a 
man, age 44. He was required to undergo dialysis when his kidneys failed and 
then received a kidney transplant. The jury awarded $600,000 for pain and 
suffering. In Lawler v. Lomont a female special education assistant, age 33, 
suffered delayed diagnosis of cancer when a physician misread her pap smears 
over a two-year period. The defendant admitted liability.  The cancer spread 
and a radical hysterectomy was required. The woman obviously cannot have 
                                                 
120 David Studdert et al, Are Damage Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in 
California, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 54 (2004). A footnote omitted in the above quotation references 
Frank Sloan and C.R. Hsieh, Variabilty in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation 
Fair? 24 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 601 (1990) which also pointed out a similar inequity in pre-
1990 cases.  
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children and suffers from fear that the cancer will recur. The jury awarded $2.5 
million for pain and suffering. 
Are the amounts awarded for these injuries too much? That is a matter 
on which reasonable people can disagree. It is important to consider cases like 
the one described above. Fairness issues for patients injured from medical 




Serious issues can be raised about whether a cap on pain and suffering will 
reduce doctors’ insurance premiums. The chapter also discusses the proportion 
of jury awards that are for “pain and suffering” and discusses justice issues 












Doctors in Illinois: 1993-2003 
 One of the concerns about jury verdicts and the tort system is that as a 
result of jury verdicts and their impact on settlements doctors may be leaving 
the State of Illinois for other states.122  
To examine these claims, I researched the American Medical 
Association’s Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the US, an annual 
publication that provides a number of important statistics about doctors, 
including county breakdowns by state, some information on certain specialties 
and state-by-state comparisons of physician-to-population ratios.  
 
Qualifiers to the Statistics 
There is a two–year time lag between the date of the publication and the 
statistics. Thus, for example, the 2005 edition presents data on doctors as of 
December 31, 2003.123 Consequently, the data reported in this chapter begin 
with 1993 and end at 2003. The data cannot speak to changes in Illinois 
doctors after that period. Some of the statistics were used in Chapter 3 to 
assess numbers of claims in relation to treating physicians, but this chapter 
examines doctors as a primary variable.    
There are additional qualifications to these data. The first is that I have 
limited the analyses to non-federal “Total Patient Care Physicians,” as reported 
in the statistics. Some physicians are federal employees, such as those 
associated with military bases, Veterans Administration Hospitals, and the 
Public Health Service. These physicians are not affected by the liability 
                                                 
121 I want to thank  my Duke colleague and co-author, Dr. Paul Lee, who  offered comments and suggestions on a 
draft of this chapter.    
122 Illinois Chamber of Commerce as of April 24, 2005 at < http://www.ilchamber.org>, 2005 State Interactive 
Systems Ranking Study, Harris Interactive, Inc. Fact Sheet: “Illinois’ abusive legal climate is forcing doctors to 
leave the state,”  Press release of March 8, 2005;  Editorial, Illinois Supreme Court, Buying Justice, ST. LOUIS POST 
DISPATCH, November 5, 2004 at B6; Patrick Powers, Doctors Flee Hospitals in the Area, BELLEVILLE NEWS 
DEMOCRAT, Wed March 23,2005; Georgina Gustin and Phil Dine, Lax Insurance Regulation Is Core of Malpractice 
Crisis, SAINT LOUIS POST DISPATCH, January 1, 2005.  
123 American Medical Association, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE US. The editions used 
in this chapter begin in 1995 and end in 2005. 
 73
insurance crisis since the United States Government assumes tort liability for 
these providers, and malpractice claims are adjudicated under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act that provides for trial by judge alone. Other physicians are 
employed by insurance carriers or pharmaceutical companies.  
Some physicians list themselves as inactive and a few remain 
unclassified in the AMA statistics.124 Thus in 2003 Illinois had a total of 37,608 
physicians, of whom 30,264 classified themselves as non-federal physicians 
focused on patient care, although of this number 3,147 classified themselves 
as “inactive.”125 Some physicians may only be working part-time and others 
may have limited their practices, e.g., abandoned surgery, certain types of 
surgery, or stopped delivering babies.   
 
Illinois Physicians: 1993-2003 
Of the 37,608 private physicians in Illinois in 2003, fully 30,264 were 
classified as patient care physicians. The remainder were designated as “other 
professional activity” (1,772), “inactive” (3,147) and “not classified” (2,425). The 
“not classified” physicians may or may not be treating physicians and “inactive” 
physicians might still carry liability insurance. However, for purposes of the 
analyses, I chose the AMA’s definition of “Total Patient Care Physicians”  
 The statistics provide some general breakdowns as to how physicians 
classify their practice, but these are self-designations and do not provide 
estimates of types of actual patient care. Thus, an obstetrician/gynecologist 
may not deliver babies as part of his or her practice or may refer difficult cases 
to another obstetrician. A surgical specialist may conduct only low-risk surgery 
and avoid high-risk operations. A physician whose classification is “Family 
Medicine/General Practitioner” may conduct surgery or deliver babies.   
 
 
                                                 
124 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHYSICIAN CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION IN THE US, 2005 Edition, 
at xix-xxiii. 
125 Id at page 222, Table 3.11 
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 Table 6.1 allows examination of trends in the total number of patient 
care physicians with separate breakdowns for Obstetric-gynecologists and 
Neurological surgeons. The two specialty groups are alleged to have been most 
affected by the liability insurance problem. 










2003 30264 1814 212 
2002 29,135 1774 205 
2001 29,116 1769 199 
2000 28,730 1796 209 
1999 27,779 1715 207 
1998 27,630 1800 205 
1997 27,733 1785 208 
1996 26,758 1734 204 
1995 26,054 1669 213 
1994 25,020 1547 192 
1993 24,514 1596 191 
 
Table 6.1 shows a steady increase in the absolute number of Illinois’ total 
patient care physicians. With some year-to-year variations the trend is upward 
or steady for Ob-Gyns and neurological surgeons. 
But how do these trends track against changes in Illinois’ population? 
The AMA‘s data also provide information on the total number of physicians per 
100,000 population and physician-population ratios ranked by state. These 
data are reported in Table 6.2 and are based on total non-federal doctors 
versus patient care doctors.  
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Table 6.2: Patient Care Physicians Per 100,000 Persons 











2003 239 17 
2002 235 15 
2001 237 13 
2000 231 11 
1999 229 12 
1998 233 11 
1997 235 11 
1996 226 11 
1995 221 11 
1994 213 13 
1993 211 13 
 
 
 Table 6.1 shows that the total number of patient care physicians and 
physicians in obstetrics-gynecology and neurological surgery have steadily 
increased in Illinois since 1993. Table 6.2 shows that adjusted for Illinois 
population growth the ratio of patient care physicians has also increased. 
 Table 6.2 does show that Illinois’ ranking in patient care population to 
physician ratios has slipped relative to other states. It is not clear what should 
be made of this last finding. It could be interpreted as Illinois losing out to 
other states. An alternative way of looking at the data in the table is that 
Illinois’ increase in the population to physician ratio is just slower relative to 
other states.  
The other problem with rankings is that rankings they tend to exaggerate 
small differences. Consider that in 2002 New Hampshire was ranked 16th with 
a 240 ratio; Oregon was ranked 22nd with a 235 ratio; Virginia was ranked 12th 
with a 244 ratio; and Washington was ranked 16th with a 237 ratio. In 2003 
the rankings and ratios had changed: New Hampshire was ranked 14th with a 
240 ratio; Oregon was ranked 18th with a 235 ratio; Virginia was ranked 12th 
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with a 244 ratio; and Washington was ranked 16th with a 303 ratio. Thus, New 
Hampshire increased in its ranking even though it dropped four figures in the 
ratio of patients to physicians. Oregon maintained the same ratio but jumped 
from 22nd up to 18th. A state with a small population can gain or lose a 
relatively small number of doctors and that will substantially alter the ratio. If 
a state with a large population gains or loses the same number of doctors as 
the small state, the ratio will hardly be affected. 
In short, the rankings were included in Table 6.2 because it was proper 
to do so as well as to avoid any appearance that the data are not fully 
presented. However, as explained immediately, above rankings can be very 
misleading.  The bottom line is that the number of patient-treating physicians 
in Illinois has increased, not decreased.    
 
Patient Care Physicians: Madison and St. Clair Counties 1993-2003 
 Madison and St Clair counties have received special attention. A 
November 2003 Article in the Belleville News Democrat quoted a Memorial 
Hospital spokesman as saying  “the hospital has lost 59 doctors since the 
beginning of the year.”126 One report in 2004 stated: “[a]t least 60 doctors in 
the past two years have left or announced plans to leave Madison and St. Clair 
counties.” 127  In March 2005 the Belleville News Democrat put the figure at 
136.128 The Springfield Journal Register, the St. Louis Post Dispatch, and the 
Wall Street Journal have reported that the two counties’ hospitals have lost 161 
physicians.129  The figure of 136 is based on a study by Navin and Sullivan on 
                                                 
126 Patrick Powers, Doctor Exodus Continues, Belleville NEWS DEMOCRAT, Nov 9, 2003 at 
<,http:/www.Belleville.com/mld/newsdemocrat/7218042.htm>.  
127 Steve Stanek, Doctors Flee Illinois, HEALTH CARE NEWS, April 2004  
<http:/www.heartlend.org/Article.cfm?artId=14633>. 
128 Patrick Powers, Doctors Flee Area Hospitals, March 23, 2005 at < 
http:/www.jobsillinois.us/news/contentview.asp?c=150575>. 
129 Dean Olson, Shimkus: Chance for Malpractice Caps Getting Better, JOURNAL REGISTER February 24, 2005; 
William Lamb, Illinois Trauma Cases Surge at SLU, POST DISPATCH , Monday January 10, 2005; Sherman Joyce, 
Judicial Hellholes, WALL STREET JOURNAL, December 15, 2004 at A 20  . 
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the health Care Sector in Madison and St. Clair counties and will be discussed 
below.130 It is not clear where or how the other figures originated. 
Unfortunately, the AMA data do not extend into 2004 and 2005 to 
directly address all of these claims. Nevertheless, data up to 2003 may give 
insights that can prompt additional discussion. 
 Tables 6.3 and 6.4 provide statistics on doctors in Madison and St. Clair 
counties, respectively, from 1993 through 2003. These statistics deal only with 
non-federal physicians. They are disaggregated by the self-described practices 
of the physicians.   
 
Table 6.3: Non-federal Physicians in Madison County 






















2003 338 280 39 94 72 50 25 5 44 9 
2002 341 286 37 99 72 53 25 6 39 10 
2001 341 292 38 100 75 58 21 7 33 9 
2000 328 282 37 98 73 58 16 7 28 11 
1999 334 279 34 94 77 60 14 8 28 19 
1998 332 277 34 90 78 59 16 8 28 2 
1997 329 277 30 83 74 58 32 8 32 12 
1996 328 281 32 87 78 59 25 8 28 11 
1995 318 266 35 78 73 57 23 8 32 12 
1994 316 275 37 73 74 64 27 8 29 4 
1993 317 274 36 75 74 61 28 6 29 8 
 
                                                 
130 John Navin and Timothy Sullivan, Recommended for a Healthy Economy: The Importance of the Health Care 
Sector in Madison and St. Clair Counties, SIU , Edwardsville, March 2005. 
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Table 6.4: Non-federal Physicians in St. Clair County 






















2003 526 431 72 112 85 78 84 15 60 20 
2002 503 402 67 112 81 84 58 19 60 22 
2001 494 402 57 116 82 87 60 19 60 13 
2000 493 396 56 117 78 86 59 17 59 21 
1999 456 356 48 102 82 80 44 19 60 21 
1998 432 348 48 100 81 72 47 16 52 16 
1997 386 320 33 95 78 72 42 15 48 3 
1996 376 312 38 88 74 73 39 15 43 6 
1995 354 292 37 87 72 65 31 13 43 6 
1994 351 298 40 86 71 65 36 15 34 4 
1993 345 297 45 79 74 60 39 11 33 4 
 
Table 6.3 shows a slight drop in total patient care physicians in 2002 
and 2003 in Madison County compared to 2001.  But 2001 appears to be an 
anomalous year with respect to total number of treating physicians in the 
sense that instead of a slow rise in the number of physicians by one or two 
annually the number jumped by 10. On the other hand the number of 
“inactive” physicians increased steadily so that in 2003 fully 40 physicians 
stated they were inactive.  
 In contrast to Madison, St. Clair County shows a steady increase in both 
total number of physicians and the total number of patient care physicians and 
a big jump in the number of physicians describing themselves as having a 
hospital-based practice.  
 One could ascribe the drop in total patient care physicians and increase 
in inactive physicians in 2003 to increased liability insurance premiums, but 
the problem with this interpretation is that it is contradicted by the increase in 
treating doctors and the stable rate of inactive doctors in St. Clair County. 
Doctors in St. Clair County were presumably exposed to the same rates of 
liability insurance premiums as those in Madison County. Perhaps the 
explanation lies in shifting demographics, even including the possibility that 
some doctors have shifted their offices from Madison County to St. Clair 
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County. Perhaps another clue lies in the big jump in hospital-based practice in 
St. Clair in 2003.   
The data do not allow conclusions on these hypotheses, but they do 
invite closer examination and research on issues that may arise. However, 
taken as a whole, the data for the combined two counties are not consistent 
with a sudden decrease in the availability of physicians overall. A simple 
calculation from data in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 shows that in 2003 there were 711 
private patient care physicians in the two counties compared to 678 in the year 
2000, a year just before the liability insurance premiums began to increase. 
Put in percentage terms in 2003 the number of patient care physicians had 
actually increased by four percent.  
 The data in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 do not address the claim that 56 or 60 or 
161 physicians have left the Madison-St. Clair county area as of 2005 since the 
data extend only to 2003. But they do pose a serious need to document the 
claim. Does the claim include federal doctors who are transferred or otherwise 
move from one federal facility to another? Is the figure of 60-161 doctors a net 
loss or gross loss? Doctors retire or move away from areas, medical residents 
finish their residencies and move to different locations, but often other doctors 
replace them. The central issue is net loss not gross loss.   
 The data are also inconsistent with the Navin and Sullivan report on 
Madison and St. Clair counties131 that apparently gave rise to the claims of the 
loss of 136 to 161 doctors in the area. Their report was concerned with 
employment in the health sector, including support staff, and used two sources 
of data. One source was the number of physicians’ offices in the counties 
through 2002.132  They concluded that the number of physician offices dropped 
by about 2.5% between 1998 and 2002.  
 
                                                 
131 John Navin and Timothy Sullivan, Recommended for a Healthy Economy: The Importance of the Health Care 
Sector in Madison and St. Clair Counties, SIU , Edwardsville, March 2005. 
132  Id at 10. 
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These figures do not correspond with calculations we can make with the 
AMA’s figures that can be calculated from Tables 6.3 and 6.4.  Combining total 
physicians for the two counties yields the following finding: In 1998 there were 
764 total physicians and in 2002 there were 844 physicians, a gain of 10 
percent. If we limit the calculations to treating physicians, the figures for 1998 
and 2002 are, respectively, 673 and 688, a gain of two percent. By either 
measure the AMA figures show a gain, not a loss of physicians. 
 The second measure used by Navin and Sullivan was hospital staff 
listings from six area hospitals for the years 2002 through 2004. After culling 
for duplicate names those authors identified 798 physicians listed in 2004 
compared to 934 physicians, a difference of 136, or 15 percent. Their figures 
for 2002 again appear different from the AMA data indicating a total of 844 
physicians (688 treating physicians) in 2002. One plausible hypothesis for the 
discrepancy probably lies in the fact that this measure from the Navin and 
Sullivan report is based on physicians with hospital privileges. These listings 
could include physicians from out of the area or even from out of the state, e.g., 
Missouri. Federal as opposed to non-federal physicians may also be listed in 
their data. The difference could also be due to changes in the way that doctors 
practiced medicine or how hospitals classified physicians.  
There are possibly other plausible explanations, but the Navin and 
Sullivan data based on hospital staff listings are clearly not a good source of 
data for estimating the number of physicians or changes in the number of 
physicians.  
The American Medical Association statistics are clearly the official and 
superior source of data. Their statistics data for 2004 will eventually allow a 
further comparison with the Navin and Sullivan findings and might, in the end, 
support their conclusions by showing a loss of physicians. Nevertheless, it 
should be clear that their research should not be relied on for a source of 




The AMA statistics for 2003 also are inconsistent with the Memorial 
Hospital spokesperson’s claim that that hospital alone lost 59 doctors. Perhaps 
the statement was accurate but omitted replacement doctors. If many of the 59 
doctors were medical residents finishing their period of residency, they would 
have been expected to leave but would be replaced by new doctors working on 
their residency.   
In short, the AMA statistics through 2003 do not support claims of a loss 
of doctors in Madison and St.Clair counties. 
 
Conclusion 
 As of the year 2003, the American Medical Association’s statistics do not 
provide support for a claim that doctors are leaving the State of Illinois or that 
the number of non-Federal physicians has decreased in the Madison-St.Clair 
county area. Changes may have indeed occurred since 2003, but proponents of 
the claim of major losses of doctors have not substantiated their claims in any 
sources that I could find.      








  Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions 
 This report opened with the assumption that the medical insurance 
liability premiums for Illinois’ doctors have increased dramatically in recent 
years. Nothing in this report challenges that assumption. The findings of the 
research in the report, however, strongly challenge widely made claims about 
the role of the Illinois tort system as a cause of the increase in these premiums. 
 
Data 
Claims have been made that the number of lawsuits has increased 
dramatically in recent years. Data on medical malpractice lawsuit filings in 
Cook and DuPage counties give no support to this claim. Claims have been 
made that there has been an increase in jury trials. Data from the United 
States Bureau of Statistics study of civil litigation indicate that the number of 
jury trials in 2001 in Cook County and DuPage counties actually decreased 
when compared to 1996. Data from the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter 
showed that combined data from Cook and DuPage counties showed that, with 
the exception of a modest fluctuation in 2002, the number of trials remained 
steady between 2001 and 2004. Data also showed that the actual payouts were 
often much smaller than the jury verdicts.  
Claims have been made that Madison and St. Clair counties are “judicial 
hell holes” for doctors. Data showed that from 1992 through the first quarter of 
2005 there was a total of 26 medical malpractice jury trials—1.7 trials per 
year--and that plaintiffs prevailed only 11 times in this 14-year period. Only 
two awards exceeded $1 million. Claims have been made that a cap on pain 
and suffering will alleviate some of the large awards and lead to reduced 
premiums. The data suggest that the effects of caps would likely be minimal 
and possibly result in unfairness to negligently injured patients.  
 Claims have been made that doctors were leaving the state of Illinois for 
states with more benign litigation climates. Data from the American Medical 
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Association show that from 1993 through 2003 the actual number of patient 
care physicians has increased steadily in absolute numbers and in the ratios of 
population to physicians. Claims have been made that large numbers of 
doctors in the Madison and St. Clair counties have been fleeing or retiring from 
practice as a result of its litigation climate.  Not according to the American 
Medical Association statistics through 2003. Compared to the year 2000 the 
number of patient care doctors actually increased by four percent.  
 
Missing Data 
 The publicly available data did not allow an assessment of actual 
payouts from settlements, the litigation costs from claims in which no 
payments were made, or costs for paid cases in which payments were made. 
These and many other variables that could have shed additional light on the 
current debate exist in closed claim files of the Illinois Department of 
Insurance.  
 Clearly these data should be made available to the public as they are in 
Florida and Texas. Doctors and patients and interest groups on both sides of 
the controversy, indeed the citizens who pay taxes to have these important data 
collected, should have a right to know. The controversy regarding health care 
should be resolved with data rather than by anecdote and questionable 
statistics. 
 
If Not the Tort System…? 
 Think of a crude analogy.  A patient goes to the doctor with a sore throat 
and other symptoms. The doctor suspects a bacterial infection, takes a throat 
swab, and sends it to a laboratory. The report comes back negative. That cause 
eliminated, the doctor then begins to look for other causes of the ailment. 
 For more than a quarter century the American civil jury system and the 
citizens who serve on it have been defamed by variations on the claim that 
juries too often “act like Santa Claus handing out millions of dollars in cases 
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involving comparably minor injuries.”133 The best data for Illinois that were 
available for this report indicate that juries are not to blame for the problems 
involving the increases in doctor’s liability premiums. It is time to look for other 
causes of the ailment.  Some have been suggested but that is beyond the scope 
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